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SPILLOVER ACROSS REMEDIES 
Michael Coenen* 
98 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming) 
Abstract:  Remedies influence rights, and rights apply across remedies.  
Combined together, these two phenomena produce the problem of spillover 
across remedies.  The spillover problem occurs when considerations 
specific to one remedy affect the definition of a substantive rule that 
governs in other remedial settings. For example, the severe remedial 
consequences of suppressing incriminating evidence might generate 
substantive Fourth Amendment precedents that make other Fourth 
Amendment remedies (such as damage awards, injunctions, or ex ante 
denials of search warrants) more difficult to obtain.  Or, the rule of lenity 
might yield a narrowed reading of a statutory rule in a criminal case, which 
then carries binding effect on subsequent attempts to secure civil relief 
under the same statutory provision.  In these and other contexts, the cross-
remedial scope of substantive rules can give rise to significant doctrinal 
distortions, with one remedy’s influence on a substantive norm dictating the 
outcome of cases that would otherwise implicate different remedial 
considerations. 
This Article documents several examples of cross-remedial spillover and 
considers several possible responses to it.  Its central conclusion is that 
courts can best manage the spillover problem by varying the applicability of 
substantive rules across different remedial domains.  Such disaggregation 
strategies already exist to some extent in the law, implemented most often 
through the use of discrete, transsubstantive exceptions to remedial 
requirements (consider, for instance, the qualified immunity defense to 
damages liability under § 1983, or the harmless error exception to the 
reversal remedy on direct appeals).  Nonetheless, as this Article 
demonstrates, courts can more effectively disaggregate substantive norms—
and thus more effectively mitigate spillover across remedies—by utilizing a 
significantly more nuanced and substance-specific set of remedial 
exceptions.  In effect, such an approach would yield hybridized rules of 
“right-remedy” law, with precedential effects extending no further than 
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particularized combinations of substantive and remedial domains.  Although 
that outcome might give some readers pause, it is in fact a sensible and 
feasible objective for courts to pursue. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 In adjudicating claims for relief, courts often proceed as follows: 
First, they ask whether a violation of the law has occurred. If so, they next 
ask whether they may furnish the requested relief.  The first part of the 
analysis looks to the domain of substantive law, which allocates rights and 
duties among legal entities in their dealings with one another.1 The second 
                                                
1 A more complete list might also include powers, liabilities, liberties, no-rights, and 
other variations.  See Welsey Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917).  Unless otherwise indicated, I will 
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part of the analysis looks to the law of remedies, which tells courts when 
and how to provide redress for demonstrated legal wrongs.2  To obtain its 
requested relief, then, a litigant must show both that the substantive law has 
been breached and that remedial law authorizes the form of relief being 
sought. 
As a formal matter, the law of remedies operates independently of 
the substantive law.  In expanding or contracting the availability of 
injunctions, declaratory judgments, damage awards, evidentiary exclusion, 
habeas corpus writs, and other forms of judicial remediation, courts do not 
purport to alter the rights and powers that the substantive law confers.  
Thus, for instance, a judicial denial of redress is not necessarily tantamount 
to a judicial declaration that no wrongdoing occurred; courts can—and 
often do—stay their remedial hand without signing off on the lawfulness of 
the conduct for which the remedy was sought.  This is a basic feature of 
public law adjudication: What happens in remedial law stays in remedial 
law, or so we are told.3 
 As a functional matter, however, remedial law interacts with rights-
based law in complex ways.  Most evidently, legal remedies determine the 
efficacy of legal rights.  A right without a remedy is like a ship without a 
sail—existent and identifiable, but of little practical use to anyone.  Court-
ordered remedies operationalize the substantive law: they help to deter 
unlawful behavior, compensate victims of legal wrongs, punish law-
breakers, and in other ways vindicate the interests that substantive rules 
exist to promote.  In this sense, diminished legal remedies yield weakened 
substantive protections, just as augmented legal remedies make substantive 
protections more robust.4 
                                                                                                                       
use the term “rights” as a sort of shorthand for the broader set of substantive entitlements 
that individuals and government actors might hold against one another. 
2 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 154 (1803) (asking, first, “[h]as the 
applicant a right to the commission he demands?”  And second, “if he has a right, and that 
right has been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy?”).  Modern 
opinions need not (and do not) always follow this order when issuing a denial of relief.  
See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (permitting judges to depart from 
merits-first adjudication in constitutional tort proceedings).  When and to what extent 
judges should engage in merits-first analysis (as opposed to other forms of “decisional 
sequencing”) is a subject of rich debate, see, e.g., Peter B. Rutledge, Decisional 
Sequencing, 62 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2010), but that debate lies beyond the scope of this 
analysis.  For purposes of this Article, it suffices to note that courts almost always treat 
substantive questions and remedial questions as analytically distinct. 
3 See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 (1983) (“The question whether the 
exclusionary rule’s remedy is appropriate in a particular context has long been regarded as 
an issue separate from the question whether the Fourth Amendment rights of the party 
seeking to invoke the rule were violated by police conduct.”). 
4 See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 
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 A second sense in which substantive and remedial law interact 
concerns not the enforcement of the substantive law, but rather the shaping 
of its content.  For example, before ruling on the merits of a legal dispute, 
courts might anticipate the remedial consequences of a legal violation, and 
having done so, become more or less inclined to declare that a legal 
violation occurred.  Some scholars have suggested, for instance, that the 
exclusionary remedy deters the development of strong substantive Fourth 
Amendment protections, as trial judges, loath to suppress damning 
evidence, find clever ways to declare that no constitutional violation ever 
occurred.5  Along similar lines, scholars have suggested that non-
retroactivity rules facilitate the expansion of individual liberties, by 
reducing the deterrent effect that the otherwise high cost of retroactive 
remediation would exert on judges contemplating changes in the substantive 
law.6  Remedial dynamics may affect rights-based law in subtler ways as 
well.  They may, for instance, introduce selection biases into the pool of 
                                                                                                                       
COLUM. L. REV. 857, 887 (1999). 
5 Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 799 
(1994); Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 112 
(2003); Section II.E infra; see also Steven M. Shepard, Note, The Case Against Automatic 
Reversal of Structural Errors, 117 YALE L.J. 1180 (2008) (suggesting that the high cost of 
automatic reversal remedy deters appellate courts from identifying constitutional criminal 
procedure violations when reviewing trial court proceedings); Sonja B. Starr, Sentence 
Reduction as a Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct, 97 GEO. L.J. 1509, 1515–16 (2009) 
(identifying a similar phenomenon in connection with prosecutorial misconduct claims); 
Sonja B. Starr, Rethinking “Effective Remedies”: Remedial Deterrence in International 
Courts, 83 NYU L. REV. 693 (2008) (exploring connection between high-cost remedies 
applied by International Criminal Tribunals and the shaping of international human rights 
law). See generally Levinson, supra note ?, at 889–99 (describing this phenomenon as 
“remedial deterrence”). 
6 John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. 
L. REV. 47, 80 (1998) (“Nonretroactivity facilitated the creation of new rights by reducing 
the costs of innovation.”); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap In Constitutional 
Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87 (1999) (suggesting that immunity rules in constitutional tort law 
“advance[s] the growth and development of constitutional law”); see also Daniel B. 
Rodriguez, Of Gift Horses and Great Expectations: Remands Without Vacatur in 
Administrative Law, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599, 601 (2004) (criticizing courts’ use of “remand 
without vacatur” remedies in administrative law on the ground that the low-cost features of 
the remedy “facilitate[] the use of more aggressive judicial scrutiny of agencies’ reasoning 
process”).  Professor Richard Fallon has embraced this basic insight in terms of what he 
calls the “Equilibration Thesis,” which holds that “justiciability, substantive, and remedial 
doctrines are substantially interconnected and that courts frequently face a choice about 
which doctrine to adjust in order to achieve acceptable results overall.”  Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies – And Their Connections To 
Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 692 (2006); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Asking 
the Right Questions About Officer Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 480 (2011). 
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litigants who advance particular substantive claims.7  Or, perhaps, they may 
trigger cognitive biases within the judges evaluating these claims.8  
Remedial fingerprints, simply put, lie all over the substantive law.  
Sometimes overtly, sometimes covertly, rules governing the redress of legal 
wrongs influence courts’ definitions of the legal wrongs themselves. 
 This form of right-remedy interdependence has recently attracted the 
attention of public law scholars.   Their work has yielded valuable new 
insights on the age-old right-remedy distinction and has helped to 
underscore the importance of thinking carefully about the remedial 
environments from which substantive law emerges. Though varied in its 
evaluative approaches and prescriptive contributions,9 all of the scholarship 
                                                
7 See, e.g., Kate Stith, The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences 
of the Asymmetry in the Right to Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6 (1990) (noting the possible 
existence of “a pro-defendant bias in the application and evolution of legal standards” 
resulting from the government’s inability to obtain reversals of acquittals in criminal 
cases); Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 474 (2011) (documenting 
systematic bias in favor of patentability “arising from the asymmetric nature of appeals 
from the PTO to the Federal Circuit”); see also John M. Graebe, Objecting at the Altar: 
Why the Good Faith Principle and the Harlow Qualified Immunity Doctrine Should Not Be 
Married, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1, 15 (2012) (noting potential substantive effects 
arising from the involvement of private insurance attorneys—rather than government 
attorneys—in representing defendants in constitutional tort suits). 
8 Commentators have suggested, for example, that the exclusionary remedy triggers 
the application of “hindsight bias” in Fourth Amendment cases, whereby judges’ ex post 
knowledge of a search’s results distorts their view of whether probable cause existed to 
conduct the search ex ante.  See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck 
the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 403; William J. Stuntz, Warrants and 
Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 912 (1991); see also Pamela S. Karlan, 
Race, Rights, and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2019–20 
(1998) (suggesting that hindsight bias might also prejudice appellate courts’ after-the-fact 
review of Batson claims asserted by defendants who were convicted in the court below). 
9 Within individual fields, commentators have drawn attention to linkages between 
remedial context and substantive law, and some commentators have proposed targeted 
responses to such linkages they deem to be problematic. See notes 4–7 supra.  More 
systematic examinations of the phenomenon offer functional taxonomies of right-remedy 
relationships, emblematized by Professor Daryl Levinson’s work on the “equilibration” 
phenomenon that inheres in the transposition of remedial and substantive rules.  See, e.g., 
Levinson, supra note ?, at 889–913; see also Fallon [VA. L. REV.], supra note ?,  at 681–88 
(building on Levinson’s work to develop a general thesis  regarding the interconnectivity of 
justiciability rules, substantive law, and remedial law).  In a related vein, Professor Nancy 
Leong has investigated the frequency with which different types of Fourth Amendment 
claims arise in different remedial contexts, while also advancing the thesis that courts 
produce higher quality law when they adjudicate substantive rights across multiple 
remedial environments.  Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405 (2012); see 
also Section II.C infra.  Finally, Professor Jennifer Laurin has investigated the processes by 
which different remedial contexts shape the definition and implementation of criminal 
procedure rights, focusing in particular on ameliorating “language barriers” that materialize 
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in this area adheres the basic premise that remedy-related variables affect 
not just the intensity with which substantive rights get enforced, but also the 
content of the substantive rights themselves.   
Left largely unaddressed by this work, however, is a basic question: 
Is it bad for remedies to influence the shaping of substantive law and, if so, 
why?  Consider, for instance, the argument that the exclusionary rule 
problematically “distorts” Fourth Amendment protections, by making 
judges hesitant to declare that searches violate the Constitution.  Taken 
alone, this claim offers no meaningful criticism of the status quo.  For one 
thing, it begs the question of what an “undistorted” set of Fourth 
Amendment protections would look like.  Unless we are prepared to call for 
the shaping of rights-based doctrine in a vacuum—uninfluenced by 
remedial considerations in every potential way—then we must concede that 
there is no such thing as a “pure” legal right for remedies to come in and 
corrupt.  The harm of “distortion,” in other words, cannot lie in the mere 
fact that remedies influence rights; that is, after all, the fact whose harm we 
are attempting to discover. 
 Perhaps, though, the “distortion” argument might go as follows:  
The problem with the exclusionary rule is not merely that it shapes Fourth 
Amendment doctrine, but that, relative to other potential remedies, it 
produces fewer judicial findings that Fourth Amendment violations have 
occurred.  If we were to replace the exclusionary rule with a more lenient 
remedy—say, a small reduction in the defendant’s sentence,10 or limited 
damages liability against the offending public entity11—then courts would 
more often invalidate searches under the Fourth Amendment and thereby 
create a more expansive set of Fourth Amendment requirements.  But even 
if that premise is true, civil libertarians should not necessarily abandon the 
exclusionary rule.  For, as we already noticed above, weakened remedies 
reduce the real-world effectiveness of the rights to which they attach.  (All 
else equal, for instance, the availability of the exclusionary remedy is more 
likely to deter unlawful behavior than the prospect of a nominal damages 
award.)  To evaluate the exclusionary rule’s desirability from this 
perspective, the civil libertarian would have to ask whether courts will 
better safeguard Fourth Amendment freedoms by remediating violations 
more harshly but less frequently (i.e., with the exclusionary rule), or more 
frequently but less harshly (i.e., with a modest monetary sanction or another 
remedy of roughly equivalent lenience).  That is an important question, to 
                                                                                                                       
when courts attempt to enforce constitutional criminal procedure protections in civil cases.  
Jennifer E. Laurin, Rights Translation and Remedial Disequilibration, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 
1002, 1007 (2010). 
10 See Calabresi, supra note ?, at 116–18.  
11 See Slobogin, supra note ?, at 405–18. 
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be sure, but it relates not so much to the “distortion” of Fourth Amendment 
law as it does to the question of how courts should mete out limited 
remedial capital across a range of cases.12 
 There is, however, a third and more promising respect way to frame 
the “distortion” argument.  The key move is to recognize that Fourth 
Amendment law gets applied in remedial environments other than criminal 
suppression hearings.  Magistrate judges apply the Fourth Amendment 
when deciding whether to issue a warrant.  Section 1983 cases present 
Fourth Amendment questions linked to requests for injunctions, damages, 
or declaratory relief.  Fourth Amendment claims might even arise in 
criminal prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 241.  These environments concern 
remedies very different from the suppression of evidence in criminal cases.  
And yet, judges who operate within these environments sometimes apply 
precedents that derive from suppression motions in criminal cases.  Thus, 
when remedial dynamics unique to the question of suppression deter the 
finding of a Fourth Amendment violation, the effects of the holding threaten 
to spill over into other remedial settings in which the same right gets 
adjudicated.  The distortionary harm, in other words, stems not just from the 
fact that remedies influence substantive law, but from the further fact that 
substantive law applies across multiple remedial contexts.  Formally 
speaking, we do not have different Fourth Amendment doctrines for § 1983 
actions, suppression hearings, probable cause hearings, and so on.  Instead, 
there simply is one Fourth Amendment doctrine, and it applies equally 
across these different remedial contexts.  Thus, when a particular remedial 
environment influences the shaping of Fourth Amendment law, the 
alteration applies beyond its own remedial boundaries.  
 This particular problem—what I call the problem of spillover across 
remedies—is the focus of this Article.  Several areas of substantive 
doctrine, I argue, have developed (or are at risk of developing) features that, 
while responsive to the demands of a single remedial environment, affect 
the law’s application within other such environments as well.  Once 
embedded in the substantive law, a “remedy-specific” influence becomes 
part of a “cross-remedial” doctrine, destined to manifest itself within other 
remedial environments where it would not otherwise have taken hold.  The 
spillover problem, in other words, arises as a consequence of two bedrock 
features of public law adjudication: (1) the inescapable intertwinedness of 
substantive and remedial law; and (2) the generalized application of 
substantive law across multiple remedial settings.  When one remedy affects 
the scope of a substantive rule, the cross-remedial nature of that rule 
                                                
12 To be clear, the point is not that such reform proposals are misguided; rather, it is 
that the reform proposals target something other than “distortions” within the substantive 
law.  
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threatens to distort its development within other remedial settings.13 
 With the spillover problem thus acknowledged, the question 
becomes how to deal with it.  The central thesis of this Article is that courts 
can best manage spillover through strategies of disaggregation, which vary 
the applicability of substantive rules across the different remedies used to 
enforce them.14 Disaggregation strategies attack spillover from the back-
end.  Rather than attempt to mitigate or eliminate the ways in which 
remedies affect rights, these strategies focus on confining remedy-specific 
                                                
13 Individual examples of the spillover problem have not gone entirely unnoticed 
within the literature.  See, e.g., Laurin, supra note ?, at 1034; Starr, Rethinking “Effective 
Remedies”, supra note ?, at 720–24; John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional 
Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 275–79 (2000); Lawrence Solan, Statutory Inflation and 
Institutional Choice, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2209 (2003).  As best I can tell, however, no 
one has yet offered a systematic and transsubstantive analysis of the sort this Article seeks 
to provide. 
14 I draw this term from the scholarship of Professor John Jeffries, who has advocated 
for “disaggregating” remedial rules of constitutional tort law across different categories of 
substantive claims.  See Jeffries [Yale L.J.], supra note ?, at 280 (“It is my contention that 
the liability rule for money damages should vary with the constitutional violation at 
issue.”). This Article advocates a sort of converse strategy, which disaggregates substantive 
rules of law across different categories of remedies.  I view these two projects as 
complementary rather than in tension with one another; both are part and parcel of a 
broader effort to “reject the radical dissociation of right and remedy immanent in current 
doctrine,” id. at 281.  Indeed, as I hope to demonstrate further in Part III, the disaggregation 
of rights across remedies is facilitated, rather than hindered, by the simultaneous 
disaggregation of remedies across rights.  The two strategies proceed along different paths, 
to be sure, but both paths are ultimately headed towards the same summit. 
Of related significance to this project is Professor Jennifer Laurin’s rich 
discussion of “rights translation” within the law of constitutional criminal procedure.  In 
advocating for a process that permits certain “components” of a substantive rule to “shift in 
a new remedial context,” Laurin, supra note ?, at 1007, Professor Laurin’s work may be 
read as endorsing limited forms of disaggregation across civil-criminal boundaries.  Her 
scholarship, however, does not focus specifically on the spillover problem, and it confines 
itself exclusively to the application of criminal procedure protections in civil and criminal 
cases.  I thus regard this project as complementary to Professor Laurin’s work, as it seeks 
to bolster the case for the disaggregated law that a “rights translation” process might 
sometimes yield, while covering more expansive substantive and remedial terrains. 
 Finally, Professor Larry Sager’s “underenforcement thesis” bears mention in 
connection with this project, insofar as it advocates for a disaggregated definition of 
judicially enforceable constitutional law on the one hand and constitutional law (full stop) 
on the other. Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced 
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978).  Without such disaggregation, as 
Professor Sager points out, institutional limitations specific to the judiciary might yield 
unnecessary curtailments in the scope of substantive constitutional requirements that other 
institutional actors (such as legislators and executive officials) look to for guidance.  Id. at 
1213.  This Article builds on Professor Sager’s thesis by suggesting that further 
disaggregation can and should occur within the category of judicially enforceable 
constitutional law, so as to prevent spillover from one remedial setting into another.  
6-17-13] Spillover Across Remedies 9 
influences on rights to the particular remedial settings in which they arise.  
If, for instance, we allow equal protection rules to differ based on whether a 
litigant seeks civil or criminal relief, considerations particular to the civil 
setting are less likely to influence courts’ resolution of criminal equal 
protection claims (and vice versa).  If Fourth Amendment rules differ 
according to whether a judge is considering a suppression motion ex post or 
a warrant application ex ante, influences specific to the former remedial 
context are less likely to interfere with the Fourth Amendment’s application 
in the latter.  And so on.  Simply put, the weaker the pressures for cross-
remedial uniformity, the weaker the threat of cross-remedial spillover. 
As it turns out, many areas of the law already pursue disaggregation 
strategies of this sort.  They rely in particular on remedial exceptions, which 
limit the applicability of some (but not other) forms of relief associated with 
identical substantive claims.  These exceptions help to reduce—albeit in 
indirect (and sometimes blunt) fashion—cross-remedial spillover within the 
law of rights.  Rules of qualified and absolute immunity, for instance, 
render constitutional rights more difficult to vindicate when raised as 
“offensive” swords against public actors (for example, via actions for 
injunctive or monetary relief) rather than “defensive” shields in criminal 
prosecutions.15  Exceptions to the exclusionary rule remove some Fourth 
Amendment protections from the reach of criminal defendants at trial, even 
as those same protections might necessitate the denial of a warrant 
application, or the granting of monetary or injunctive relief in a civil 
proceeding.16  The harmless error rule creates a similar disparity between 
the (broader) set of procedural protections that are capable of yielding relief 
during trials and the (narrower) set of such protections that are capable of 
yielding reversals on appeal.17  As a formal matter, the same substantive 
claims—supported by the same substantive precedents—are asserted and 
disposed of in these different remedial contexts, and to the extent that 
variations in outcomes arise, the variations remain attributable to formally 
                                                
15 See MICHAEL L. WELLS & THOMAS A. EATON, CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES: A 
REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION xxii–xxiii (2002) (distinguishing 
between “[d]efensive, “shield-like” remedies,” and “offensive remedies”); Walter E. 
Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 
1532 (1972) (contrasting between defensive constitutional remedies, which employ the 
“sanction of nullification” of government imposed punishments, and offensive 
constitutional remedies, which seek “to use the judicial power to force affirmative action”). 
16 But see Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing 
and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 673 (2011) (identifying similarities between 
the Court’s exceptions to the exclusionary rule and its exceptions to § 1983 damages 
liability). 
17 Cf. Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1, 26 
(2002) (“Unless an appellate court determines that an error is prejudicial, the Court has no 
authority to remedy that error, by whatever means”). 
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remedial rather than formally substantive rules. From a functional 
perspective, however, remedial exceptions can (and often do) produce 
disaggregated substantive doctrine, as they render identical substantive rules 
more or less susceptible to vindication depending solely on the remedial 
context in which these rules are litigated.  A primary purpose of this Article, 
then, is to highlight this underappreciated virtue of remedial exceptions:  By 
disaggregating the application of substantive norms across remedial 
boundaries, remedial exceptions substantially mitigate the problem of 
spillover across remedies.   
That is not to say, however, that remedial exceptions currently on 
the books have enjoyed unconditional success as anti-spillover devices, and 
this Article thus goes on to propose ways in which courts might more 
effectively define and deploy these exceptions to perform this role.  
Generally speaking, the improvements I suggest involve making remedial 
exceptions more particularized and substance-specific.  Rather than employ 
a small number of broad remedial exceptions—applicable across a wide 
range of substantive norms—courts should employ a larger number of 
narrower exceptions, targeting particularized combinations of substantive 
and remedial rules.  Pushed far enough in this direction, remedial 
exceptions might even start to lose their “remedial” character altogether, 
looking less and less like discrete carve-outs to otherwise uniform rules of 
remedial law, and more and more like hybridized rules of “right-remedy” 
law, whose content depends on both the type of relief a litigant demands 
and the type of substantive claim she asserts.  That transformation would 
further increase both the appearance and reality of cross-remedial variations 
in the substantive law, making, in effect, the disaggregating function of 
remedial exceptions even more explicit and complete. 
These observations tee up the final question with which this Article 
grapples:  Is disaggregation proper?  For even if courts can best manage the 
spillover problem by varying substantive rights across remedial boundaries, 
overriding considerations may nonetheless counsel against this approach.  
In particular, I confront four separate concerns that the disaggregation 
strategy presents:  (1) that it improperly ascribes multiple definitions to 
substantive rules derived from a single textual source; (2) that it creates 
overwhelming problems of administrability; (3) that it jeopardizes 
important rule-of-law values; and (4) that, with respect to a limited category 
of rights and remedies, it impedes higher-level courts’ ability to supervise 
the work of their lower-level counterparts.  While I acknowledge the 
validity of each of these concerns, I conclude that none provides sufficient 
grounds for abandoning the disaggregation strategy altogether. 
Here, then, is the remaining plan of attack:  Part I introduces the 
spillover problem by offering examples from public law adjudication.  Part 
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II appraises a preliminary set of “non-disaggregation” anti-spillover 
strategies, each of which aims to mitigate the spillover problem while 
maintaining uniform enforcement of substantive rules across remedial 
boundaries.  For example, courts could attempt to alleviate spillover by 
forging rules of substantive law with all applicable remedial contexts in 
mind.  Or they could reform remedial structures with an eye toward 
“equalizing” the influences that different remedial structures exert on the 
shaping of substantive rules.  Or they could seek to expand the number of 
remedial settings in which a given substantive rule gets applied, with the 
hope that a “diversified” set of remedial inputs will ensure that no single 
remedy predominates in affecting the content of a substantive rule.  These 
anti-spillover strategies, I suggest, can preserve the formal uniformity of 
substantive rules across different remedial domains, but they ultimately 
provide inadequate solutions.  We should therefore consider the alternative 
strategy of disaggregating the substantive law according to different 
remedial demands. 
Part III turns to the use of remedial exceptions to achieve 
disaggregation in the law.  I first demonstrate how our current palette of 
remedial exceptions already functionally disaggregates the substantive law 
in a way that mitigates cross-remedial spillover effects, and I then suggest 
ways in which courts might further improve these exceptions’ performance 
as anti-spillover devices.  Finally, Part IV offers a qualified defense of 
disaggregation within the substantive law, concluding that no overriding 
considerations should compel us to reject it categorically. 
One final caveat:  Lest I be misunderstood, this Article is not 
intended to push for the total disaggregation of rights across remedies.  I am 
not enthusiastic about reviving the common law writ system, along with its 
myriad forms of action governed by discrete, self-contained packages of 
procedural, substantive, and remedial rules.18  Nor do I advocate for the 
total dissolution of the formal boundaries that separate “substantive” from 
“remedial” law.  Whatever the conceptual merits of the right-remedy 
distinction, it is a distinction around which the public law has organized 
itself for quite some time, and it will remain a key organizing principle of 
the doctrine for years to come.  I do not, then, propose a total restructuring 
of doctrinal rules governing judicial action in public law disputes.  Instead, I 
push for more modest improvements to categorization schemes already in 
effect.  We can, I think, achieve more disaggregation of the law (and 
concomitantly less spillover across remedies) without going so far as to 
dissolve the categories of “right” and “remedy” altogether. How far down 
this road we should travel is a difficult question that I won’t purport to 
                                                
18 See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY, 63–83 (3d ed. 
1990). 
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resolve here.  But I do hope to show that there’s plenty of room to move in 
that direction before needing to worry that we’ve gone too far.  
 
I. CROSS-REMEDIAL SPILLOVER IN ACTION 
 
 To help reveal how cross-remedial spillover happens, this Part sets 
forth some examples of the phenomenon in action.  The examples span both 
constitutional and nonconstitutional cases,19 and reveal two important 
points: (1) remedies can affect the definition of substantive rules in a variety 
of ways; and (2) substantive holdings shaped in one remedial context can 
acquire precedential force within other remedial contexts as well.  When 
these two things happen to the same substantive rule, spillover across 
remedies will occur. 
 In one sense, much of what follows should be familiar to students of 
the right-remedy relationship.  Public law scholars have long been familiar 
with the ways in which remedy-specific variables can affect courts’ 
disposition of substantive claims, and many of the examples I discuss below 
build on descriptive observations these scholars already have offered.  What 
has received less attention, however, are the cross-remedial aftershocks that 
follow from a particular remedy’s point of contact with a substantive rule.  
It is on these aftershocks that this Part seeks to shed new descriptive light.   
 
A.  Procedural Due Process Law and Monetary Relief Under § 1983 
 
In Paul v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that government-inflicted 
harm to “reputation alone” did not trigger procedural due process 
protections under the Fourteenth Amendment.20  This holding diverged 
sharply from the Court’s earlier suggestion, in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 
that due process restrictions applied whenever “a person’s good name, 
reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is 
doing to him.”21   Though not purporting to overrule Constantineau, the 
Court in Paul made clear that stigmatic injuries alone could not give rise to 
procedural due process claims; instead, stigmatic injuries could trigger such 
claims only when accompanied by some other “more tangible” harm, such 
as the loss of employment or a specific business opportunity.22 
                                                
19 This Article’s focus on rights and remedies within the public (but not private) law 
context reflects only an expositional choice.  I do not intend to communicate any deep 
point concerning the prevalence (or lack thereof) of analogous forms of spillover across 
private law remedies. 
20 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 695 (1976). 
21 Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971). 
22 Paul, 424 U.S. at 695.  
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Remedy-specific considerations favored the Court’s adoption of this 
“stigma plus” rule.  In contrast to Constantineau, where the plaintiff sought 
to invalidate a Wisconsin state statute via an injunction,23 Paul involved a 
demand for monetary relief against individual police officers.  The officers 
had circulated a flyer to hundreds of local merchants, with the names and 
photographs of supposedly “active shoplifters,” including the plaintiff, 
Davis.  Having never in fact been convicted of shoplifting, Davis sued 
under § 1983, alleging that circulation of the flyer violated his due process 
rights and demanding compensation for the reputational harm he had 
suffered.  Paul thus resembled a garden-variety defamation suit, 
pigeonholed into a § 1983 action because of the public, rather than private, 
status of the alleged defamatory actors. To the majority, this point mattered 
a great deal.  If successful, the Court reasoned, the plaintiff’s suit would 
convert the Fourteenth Amendment into a “font of tort law to be 
superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the 
States.”24  And from the Court’s reluctance “to derive from congressional 
civil rights statutes a body of general federal tort law,” it followed “[a] 
fortiori” that “the procedural guarantees of the Due Process Clause cannot 
be the source of such law.”25 
The Paul majority marshaled other arguments in support of its 
“stigma plus” approach. But many commentators have suggested that the 
“font of tort law” concern drove the Court’s ruling.26  Simply put, the 
Supreme Court did not want § 1983 to authorize defamation actions against 
public officials.  But rather than render a decision about the reach of 
permissible damage remedies under § 1983, it chose to discuss the Due 
Process Clause instead.  The upshot was the creation of rights-based law, 
applicable beyond the immediate remedial setting that Paul itself presented.  
Thus, as Professor Jeffries has pointed out, insofar as the Court in Paul 
chose to “limit[] liability by constricting rights,” its rights-based resolution 
of the case swept broadly across all other remedial contexts, “mean[ing] 
                                                
23 See Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 435. 
24 Paul, 424 U.S. at 701. 
25 Id. 
26 See, e.g., Barbara Armacost, Race and Reputation: The Real Legacy of Paul v. 
Davis, 85 VA. L. REV. 569, 576–77 & n.29 (1999) (“Many scholars have understood the 
Court’s holding to result in large part from the Court’s view that it could not permit the 
defamation claim in Paul without opening the door of the federal courts to a whole range of 
other tort-like claims involving deprivations of life, liberty, or property.”); Jeffries [Yale 
L.J.], supra note ?, at 277 (hypothesizing that “Paul v. Davis is an example of the § 1983 
tail wagging the constitutional dog”); Levinson, supra note ?, at 893 (“In all likelihood, 
Paul would have come out differently if the only available remedy had been an 
injunction.”). 
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that injunctions, defenses, and other remedies [were] also precluded.”27 
And, indeed, since its adoption, the stigma-plus rule has applied in 
remedial settings quite different from what the Court confronted in Paul.  
Courts have grappled with the rule, for instance, when considering: (1) a 
corporation’s request for a declaratory judgment regarding the 
constitutionality of CERCLA-based regulatory procedures implemented by 
the EPA;28 (2) an attorney’s motion for a “name-clearing hearing” before a 
court that sharply criticized his conduct in a published opinion;29 (3) several 
cases in which litigants sought declaratory and/or injunctive relief 
concerning the constitutionality of state-law sex offender registration 
requirements;30 and (4) a request for an affirmative injunction mandating 
                                                
27 Jeffries [Yale L.J.], supra note ?, at 289; see also Christina Brooks Whitman, 
Emphasizing the Constitutional in Constitutional Torts, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 661, 674 
(1997) (“If the Constitution is held to be inapplicable where official misconduct looks too 
much like the subject of tort, other remedies will be foreclosed as well.”).  For another 
example of damages-induced spillover, consider Professor Jeffries’s discussion of County 
of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998).  There, the Court confronted a § 1983 action 
arising from a fatal motorcycle accident that occurred in the course of a high-speed police 
chase (and allegedly caused by a deputy sheriff’s reckless driving).  The Court denied § 
1983 damages to the victim’s parents (who alleged a substantive due process violation), on 
the ground that the deputy sheriff did not actually intend to harm their son. (Reckless 
indifference or gross negligence, in other words, was simply not enough.) 
 Lewis, 523 U.S. at 854. Professor Jeffries speculates that Lewis, like Paul v. Davis, was 
“another example of the prospect of monetary damages inducing a restrictive definition of 
the underlying right,” and that, while it is impossible to know for sure, the Court might 
potentially have reacted differently to the Lewises’ claim had it arisen in “another remedial 
context.”  Jeffries, supra note ?, at 278–79.  If so, we need not look far for examples of the 
Lewis rule yielding spillover across remedies. 
Consider, for instance, the Second Circuit’s holding in Graziano v. Pataki, 689 
F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam).  There, the court denied injunctive and declaratory 
relief to a group of prisoners who alleged that they had repeatedly been denied parole for 
“arbitrary or impermissible reasons,” in violation of their substantive due process rights. Id. 
at 115.  The court made short shrift of these claims, relying on the Supreme Court’s earlier 
proclamation in Lewis that “only the most egregious official conduct can be said to be 
arbitrary in the constitutional sense,” id. at 116 (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846).  Again, 
the key point here is not that Graziano was wrongly decided, but rather that Graziano arose 
in a remedial setting very different from the one the Court confronted in Lewis.  
Nevertheless, Lewis, whose holding derived largely from concerns about awarding 
damages relief, controlled the outcome of Graziano, a case where the prospect of damages 
relief was not on the table. 
28 General Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 111, 121–23 (D.C. Cir. 2010) [That this was 
a declaratory judgment action is demonstrated by the lower court filings, see 2001 WL 
36080053]; see also Asbetic Construction Services v. EPA, 849 F.2d 765, 767–69 (2d Cir. 
1988) (similar). 
29 United States v. Sigma Intern, Inc., 300 F.3d 1278, 1280 (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc) 
(per curiam). 
30 The cases here have gone both ways.  Compare, e.g., Schepers v. Commissioner, 
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adoption of specialized procedural safeguards by a public commission 
tasked with investigating and accusing individuals of public bribery.31  
Meritorious or not, these claims gave rise to remedial requests that in no 
way threatened to open the floodgates to tort-like litigation under the Due 
Process Clause.32  Nonetheless, they all were decided by reference to a rule 
that emerged from worries about converting the Fourteenth Amendment 
into a “font of tort law.” 
 
B.  Equal Protection Law and the Civil/Criminal Divide 
 
A subtler example of the spillover problem involves the 
“discriminatory purpose” rule of Washington v. Davis.33  The plaintiffs in 
Davis sought an injunction against the D.C. Police Department, alleging 
that a screening examination for prospective employers violated 
constitutional equal protection requirements.  Because the Davis plaintiffs 
lacked direct evidence of discriminatory intent, they founded their claim on 
a showing of discriminatory impact—that is, on statistical evidence that 
white applicants far more often passed the exam than their black 
                                                                                                                       
Indiana Dept. of Correction, 691 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 2012) (finding that Indiana state sex 
offender registry did implicate valid liberty interests under Paul, because placement on the 
registry “deprives [individuals] of a variety of rights and privileges held by ordinary 
Indiana citizens”); Coleman v. Dretke, 409 F.3d 655, 673 (5th Cir. 2005) (Jones, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (arguing that a Fifth Circuit panel misapplied 
the law in a sex offender registry case, by “transforming the Paul v. Davis ‘stigma-plus’ 
test into ‘plus=stigma’”), with Gunderson v. Hvass, 339 F.3d 639, 644–45 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(rejecting a procedural due process challenge to a Minnesota sex offender statute on the 
ground that the plaintiff failed to satisfy Paul’s “stigma-plus” requirement); Doe v. Moore, 
410 F.3d 1337, 1345 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Paul v. Davis for the proposition that a sex 
offender statute did not offend any “fundamental right,” cognizable on substantive due 
process grounds); Brown v. City of Michigan City, Indiana, 462 F.3d 720, 729 (2006) 
(upholding municipal sex offender ordinance on the ground that city’s classification of the 
plaintiff as a “present threat” to children, while certainly damaging to his reputation, did 
not “fulfill the ‘plus’ factor of the Paul v. Davis test”).  Some of the inter-circuit 
disagreement on this question was put to rest by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003), where rather than 
reach the question of whether a Connecticut sex offender statute was valid under Paul, the 
Court determined that the statute’s application turned solely on the existence of a past 
conviction, and that the existence of a conviction was “a fact that a[n] offender has already 
had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest.”  Id. at 8.  Yet even the post-Doe 
cases continue to grapple with Paul and its stigma-plus rule, see, e.g., Schepers, 691 F.3d at 
1216, even though many of these cases present nothing akin to a common-law tort action. 
31 Aponte v. Calderon, 284 F.3d 184, 195–98 (2002). 
32 Paul, 424 U.S. at 701.  
33 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see also Personnel Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 
(1979); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265, 266 
(1977). 
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counterparts.34  That showing was good enough for the D.C. Circuit, which 
found for the plaintiffs.35  But the Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
discriminatory effects could not establish a constitutional violation, unless 
accompanied by a showing of discriminatory purpose.  
Animating the Court’s holding was a concern about the remedial 
consequences of a disparate impact rule.  Such a rule, as Justice White 
explained for the majority, “would be far reaching and would raise serious 
questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, 
public service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more 
burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent 
white.”36  A more exacting standard was thus necessary to prevent judicial 
meddling in these and other government operations.37  Indeed, as Professor 
Levinson has explained, invalidating the test in Davis would have “invited, 
if not compelled” the Court “to address the underlying problem of 
educational disadvantage, which might point toward massive structural 
reform of education.”38  And that, in turn, would have ultimately led the 
Court down a path without “any nonarbitrary stopping point for remedies 
short of the wholesale restructuring of the basic institutions of society to 
redistribute resources and power more fairly among racial groups.”39  This 
was, as Levinson has put it, “not a project courts would be inclined (or 
allowed) to undertake.”40  And thus Davis’s discriminatory purpose 
requirement stemmed largely from “a concern with institutional limitations, 
going to remedies.”41 
 Subsequent cases have confirmed that Davis’s rejection of disparate 
impact liability under the Equal Protection Clause applies within other 
remedial contexts.42  Notably, the discriminatory purpose rule applies with 
equal force in criminal cases, in which defendants seek not sweeping 
injunctions against government agencies, but defensive relief from the 
specific focus of government-imposed punishment.  Until recently, for 
                                                
34 Id. at 235, 237. 
35 Washington v. Davis, 512 F.2d 956, 961–65 (D.C. Cir. 1975).  
36 Davis, 426 U.S. at 248. 
37 Id. at 239, 240. 
38 Levinson, supra note ?, at 899.  
39 Id.  
40 Id.  
41 Id.; Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the 
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1414 (1988) (noting that the Davis Court “stated 
as an important justification [for its discriminatory purpose requirement] the need to limit 
the intrusiveness of federal judicial remedies”). 
42 Cf. David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 935, 952–53 (1989) (“The more important aspect of Washington v. Davis . . . was the 
Court’s ruling that the discriminatory intent standard is a comprehensive account of what 
constitutes impermissible discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
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instance, federal drug crimes involving one gram of crack cocaine were 
punished just as harshly as drug crimes involving 100 grams of powder 
cocaine.43  The 100:1 ratio, though race-neutral on its face, exerted an 
obvious discriminatory impact on African-Americans, who face far greater 
risks of prosecution on crack-cocaine charges.44  Notwithstanding powerful 
statistical confirmations of this fact, Washington v. Davis stood as an 
impenetrable barrier to equal protection relief, as black crack-cocaine 
defendants never managed to gather enough evidence to satisfy Davis’s 
discriminatory purpose requirement.45 
Perhaps the crack-cocaine sentencing regime does in fact reflect a 
discriminatory intent under Davis, or at least has such a massively disparate 
racial impact to raise a burden-shifting inference of such intent.  The 
important question for our purposes, however, is whether courts in the 
criminal setting should even be applying the Davis rule at all.  Two 
important differences between criminal and non-criminal cases suggest that 
they should not.  First, criminal cases implicate heightened liberty interests.  
“Locking someone up in cage for a period of years,” as Professor David 
Sklansky has put it, “is singularly serious business,” and that fact alone 
might justify a less “universalist” scheme of equal protection review across 
civil and criminal lines.46  Justice White himself had pointed out in a pre-
Davis decision that in criminal cases, “where the power of the State weighs 
most heavily upon the individual or the group, [courts] must be especially 
sensitive to the policies of the Equal Protection Clause.”47  Consequently, 
while the practical difficulties of remediation might be enough to justify 
tolerating discriminatory impact in connection with education, employment, 
and the disbursement of other government-provided benefits, the same 
might not be true when the government throws its citizens behind bars.48 
                                                
43 The ratio now stands at 18:1.  See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
220, 124 Stat. 2372 (to be codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)). 
44 See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 1283, 1289 (1995). 
45 See Sklansky, supra note ?, at 1303 & n.93 (citing cases for the proposition that “the 
[crack cocaine] defendants always have lost, and the opinions generally have been both 
unanimous and short”).  But cf. United States v. Blewett, No. 12-5226/5882, slip op. at  7–
11 (May 17, 2013) (relying on equal protection principles to hold that the Fair Sentencing 
Act applies retroactively to all defendants sentenced under the previous 100:1 ratio). 
46 Sklansky, supra note ?, at 1305. 
47 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964). 
48 The Court would later flip this idea on its head, implying in McCleskey v. Kemp that, 
if anything, criminal cases necessitated a less rigorous set of equal protection requirements 
than Davis and its progeny had set forth.  481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987).  Emphasizing that 
“[o]ne of society’s most basic tasks is that of protecting the lives of its citizens and one of 
the most basic ways in which it achieves the task is through the criminal laws against 
murder,” id., the Court in McCleskey rejected a statistical proffer of discrimination in 
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Second, the practical difficulties of equal protection remediation 
may actually be easier to overcome in the criminal context.  In civil cases, 
equalizing treatment of whites and nonwhites often amounts to a zero-sum 
game, in the sense that court-ordered gains for nonwhites translate directly 
into court-ordered losses for white beneficiaries of the status quo.  Hiring 
more black police officers means hiring fewer white officers; reducing de 
facto school segregation means reducing white enrollment in neighborhood 
schools; increasing welfare benefits for black recipients means decreasing 
benefits for white recipients; and so on.  But with criminal sentencing 
schemes, courts can achieve improvements for nonwhite defendants without 
worsening the situation of their white counterparts, by reducing the 
sentences that are disproportionately experienced by one racial group while 
leaving unchanged the sentences that other defendants receive.49  This is not 
                                                                                                                       
capital sentencing as insufficient to demonstrate purposeful discrimination, id. (“Because 
discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, we would demand exceptionally clear 
proof before we would infer that the discretion has been abused.”).  I share Professor 
Sklansky’s reaction to this reasoning: it reflects an “even starker illustration than the crack 
cases of the appalling blindness of our current approach to equal protection.”  Sklansky, 
supra note ?, at 1317.  Powerful as the state’s interest in preventing murder might be, that 
interest does not require courts apply relaxed equal protection standards when reviewing 
capital sentences, which, even if invalidated, would leave states free to enforce criminal 
prohibitions with very serious alternative sentences.  And when viewed against the fact that 
the sentencing determination implicates nothing less than the defendant’s interest in 
remaining alive, the McCleskey Court’s call for more equal protection deference to a state’s 
imposition of the death penalty (as compared to, say, a state’s hiring practices or allocation 
of public benefits) seems to me bizarre and wrongheaded.  See also McCleskey, 379 U.S. at 
347–48 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for giving a perverse “new 
meaning” to the notion that “death is different,” by “rely[ing] on the very fact that this is a 
case involving capital punishment to apply a lesser standard of scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause”). 
 That being said, I also agree with Professor Sklansky that McCleskey’s 
questionable logic, even if accepted, would not extend to courts’ review of crack/cocaine 
sentencing disparities under federal law.  For one thing, McCleskey’s holding derived in 
part from the Court’s desire not to intrude on sovereign states’ administration of their own 
criminal justice systems.  Such concerns are wholly absent when a federal court reviews 
the constitutionality of a federal sentencing scheme.  Sklansky, supra note ?, at 1317.  
Second, McCleskey’s result depended on the highly discretionary nature of the sentencing 
scheme that Georgia then employed, which made it especially difficult for courts to probe 
“the motives and influences” underlying any given capital verdict.  McCleskey, 491 U.S. at 
297; Sklansky, supra note ?, at 1317 n.174. The crack/cocaine laws, by contrast, “are part 
of a sentencing system that has intentionally replaced broadly diffused discretion with a 
uniform and comprehensive set of rules,” thus making it practically more feasible to 
determine whether the scheme as defined infringes on a defendant’s equal protection rights.  
Sklansky, supra note ?, at 1317. 
49 For a similar observation, applicable to claims of discriminatory prosecution, see 
Yoav Sapir, Neither Intent Nor Impact: A Critique of the Racially Based Selective 
Prosecution Jurisprudence and a Reform Proposal, 19 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 127, 138 
6-17-13] Spillover Across Remedies 19 
to say that promoting racial equality in the remedial context of criminal 
sentencing determinations is a straightforward exercise. At the very least, 
however, courts can engage in the enterprise without having to inflict direct 
costs on members of another racial group.50 
What is notable about Washington v. Davis’s migration into the 
criminal sentencing context is not simply that the migration occurred; it is 
that no court even seemed to notice, much less question, its occurrence.51  
When the Court in Davis issued a holding concerning the equal protection 
guarantee—rather than, say, a holding about the availability of injunctive 
remedies for equal protection violations—it unleashed the forces of cross-
remedial spillover.  No court thereafter deemed itself free to consider the 
possibility of varying disparate impact requirements across civil-criminal 
lines, even though different remedial dynamics might well have warranted a 
different substantive approach.  Consequently, the same substantive equal 
protection law now applies in two very different remedial contexts, even 
though fundamental differences between these two contexts might well 
warrant disparate forms of disparate impact review. 
 
C.  Hybrid Statutes 
 
The examples offered to this point come from the domain of 
constitutional law.  But spillover across remedies can occur in other fields 
as well.  Congress sometimes enacts “hybrid statutes,” which create 
nonconstitutional norms subject to both civil and criminal enforcement.  
These hybrid statutes create difficulties when the civil or criminal nature of 
                                                                                                                       
(2003). 
50 In addition, as Professor Sklansky has pointed out, while the Court “has frequently 
expressed reluctance to insert itself into matters outside its traditional domain and issues 
beyond the special competence of the judiciary,” “criminal sentencing is well inside that 
domain and close to the core of that competence.”  Id. at 1316. 
51 None of this is to say that the Davis standard applies without differentiation across 
the entire spectrum of equal protection cases.  In fact, as Professor Daniel Ortiz has 
observed, discriminatory intent requirements do in fact vary across several different areas 
of equal protection doctrine.  See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 
41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1989) (suggesting that the intent requirement “allocates [] 
burdens [of proof between the individual and the state] differently in different contexts”); 
see also id. at 1119, 1119–35 (noting that in “jury selection, voting, and education cases,” 
the Court allows “individuals to establish [] inferences [of discriminatory motivation] . . . 
with something close to a showing of discriminatory impact”); see also Betrall L. Ross II, 
The Representative Equality Principle: Disaggregating the Equal Protection Intent 
Standard, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 175, 191–97 (2012).  Thus, it would be incorrect to say that 
the Court has always shown insensitivity to context in crafting and applying the Davis rule.  
Even so, as the crack-cocaine cases illustrate, some areas of equal protection doctrine still 
adhere strictly to the letter of Davis, and within these areas, the threat of cross-remedial 
spillover remains. 
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a case brings itself to bear on an unresolved question of statutory 
interpretation, thus creating precedent that governs within both remedial 
settings. 
The distortions can run in both directions.  Consider first what 
Professor Lawrence Solan calls “statutory inflation.”52  As he explains, 
“[d]eeply entrenched in our system of statutory jurisprudence are two 
complementary canons of construction: Remedial statutes are interpreted 
liberally; penal statutes are interpreted narrowly.”53  Consequentially, for 
hybrid statutes, when interpretive questions first manifest themselves in the 
civil setting, courts might end up favoring “broad interpretations” that then 
“spill over to criminal cases, causing an increase in criminal liability.”54  
Put another way, interpretations that courts might have rejected in stand-
alone criminal cases still find their way into the criminal setting, via cross-
remedial spillover of an earlier civil holding that broadens the applicability 
of a hybrid statute.55 
Solan highlights several examples of statutory inflation.  Consider, 
for instance, insider-trading regulation under federal securities law. Neither 
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act nor SEC Rule 10b-5 makes explicit 
                                                
52 Solan, supra note ?, at 2213. 
53 Id. at 2211–12. 
54 Id. at 2213.  Or, courts might apply Chevron deference to an agency’s broad 
interpretation of a hybrid statute in a civil action and then abide by that interpretation in a 
subsequent criminal case.  See Solan, supra note ?, at 2214 (“Although the application of 
the Chevron doctrine is consistent with the broad interpretation of remedial statutes, if 
Congress also decides to criminalize the willful violation of regulations, statutory inflation 
is likely to occur.”). 
55 For those who view the rule of lenity as grounded entirely in fair-notice values, 
statutory inflation may seem unproblematic.  If a civil holding endorses a broad 
interpretation of a hybrid statute at Time A, then future criminal defendants should be able 
to anticipate that the Time A interpretation will govern their prosecution at Time B.  Put 
another way, as long as the “inflating” civil holding precedes the “inflated” criminal 
holding, and as long as everyone understands that judicial interpretations of hybrid statutes 
apply uniformly across both civil and criminal cases, then everyone should get fair notice.  
The problem, however, is that the rule of lenity may safeguard more than just the value of 
fair notice.  It might, for instance, reflect concerns about the liberty-infringing effects of 
criminal punishments, cf. United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820) 
(characterizing the rule as “founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of 
individuals”), safeguard values of legislative primacy, see Lawrence M. Solan, Law, 
Language, and Lenity, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 57, 141–43 (1998), or serve the useful 
“structural” purpose of “compel[ling] legislatures to detail the breadth of prohibitions in 
advance of their enforcement” and “compelling prosecutors to charge crimes with enough 
specificity to indicate to voters—and juries—what conduct has been treated as criminal,” 
Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity As a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 887 
(2004). Under these and other accounts of the lenity rule, statutory inflation remains worth 
worrying about. 
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reference to insider trading.56  Nevertheless, in Chiarella v. United States, 
the Supreme Court deemed this practice criminally punishable under these 
laws.57  In Chiarella, however, the Court was not writing on a blank slate.  
Instead, its ruling in the case derived from a decade’s worth of 
“administrative decisions and circuit court decisions,” all of which had 
involved private and administrative requests for civil relief.58  In citing to 
these cases, the Court in Chiarella never paused to ask whether the criminal 
nature of the case before it warranted a different interpretive approach.59  
Consequently, as Solan explains, “criminal application of Rule 10b-5 in the 
context of insider trading grew out of the broad interpretation of the rule in 
civil cases, in part as the result of aggressive administrative enforcement 
actions brought earlier by the SEC.”60 
Hybrid statutes are just as susceptible to “deflationary” 
interpretations as they are to “inflationary” ones.  Consider United States v. 
Thompson/Center Arms Co.61 In this case, an arms dealer sought a refund of 
a $200 tax levy, the validity of which turned on the meaning of the term 
“firearm” as used in the National Firearms Act (“NFA”).  A plurality of 
Justices resolved the statutory ambiguity by invoking the rule of lenity, 
even though the case before them was civil rather than criminal. Justice 
Souter’s plurality opinion justified this move by pointing to the hybrid 
nature of the NFA.  As he explained, “although it is a tax statute that we 
construe now in a civil setting, the NFA has criminal applications that carry 
no additional requirement of willfulness.”62 Framed as a rule of substantive 
law, Thompson’s interpretive holding would inevitably control in both civil 
and criminal cases.  And for that reason, the plurality opted for a narrow 
interpretation of the statutory language, thus accommodating (albeit 
preemptively) the rule-of-lenity concerns that criminal cases might one day 
                                                
56 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013); Solan, supra note ?, at 2238. 
57 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
58 See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir. 1968) 
(emphasizing that “the securities laws should be interpreted as an expansion of the 
common law both to effectuate the broad remedial design of Congress and to insure 
uniformity of enforcement” (internal citations omitted)). 
59 As Solan emphasizes, the Court in Chiarella “certainly did not consider the rule of 
lenity.”  Solan, supra note ?, at 2239. 
60 Solan, supra note ?, at 2239–40.  See also Transcript, Roundtable on Insider 
Trading: Law, Policy, and Theory After O’Hagan, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 7, 15 (1998) 
(statement of Professor Roberta Karmel) (discussing this problem in similar terms). 
61 504 U.S. 595 (1992).  For illuminating discussions of Thompson, see Solan, supra 
note ?, at 2253–55; Margaret V. Sachs, Harmonizing Civil and Criminal Enforcement of 
Federal Regulatory Statutes: The Case of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 2001 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1025, 1036; and Kristin E. Hickman, Of Lenity, Chevron, and KPMG, 26 VA. 
TAX. REV. 920–21 (2007). 
62 Id. at 617 (plurality opinion). 
22 Spillover Across Remedies [14-Aug-13 
raise. 
The Court in Thompson thus managed to head off the sort of 
statutory inflation that Chiarella reflects.  But rather than prevent spillover 
from happening, the decision simply diverted that spillover in a different 
direction.  Since Thompson was a civil case, the rule of lenity would not 
normally have come into play.  It was only the prospect of future criminal 
proceedings, based on the same statutory language, that triggered the 
Court’s invocation of the lenity rule.  In that sense, the Thompson plurality 
chose to “deflate” rather than “inflate.”  It artificially constricted the scope 
of the statute in a civil case so as to adopt what it viewed as the proper 
interpretation for criminal cases. 
 
D.  Trial Errors and Appellate Reversal 
 
Under the law of harmless error, appellate courts may excuse certain 
trial errors as nonprejudicial.  Some errors, however, are not subject to 
harmless error analysis. These errors, known as “structural errors,” trigger a 
rule of automatic reversal; no instance of structural error may be excused as 
harmless, regardless of its real-world impact. 
Commentators have suggested that the automatic reversal remedy 
induces courts to define structural rights narrowly.63  It is costly to reverse 
convictions and to have new trials below, so appellate courts will therefore 
be reluctant to impose these costs on lower courts for alleged errors that 
strike them as minor.  When judges feel this way about non-structural 
errors, they are often able to uphold convictions on grounds of 
harmlessness, reasoning that even though errors occurred below, they were 
not prejudicial enough to warrant full-scale appellate relief.  With structural 
errors, however, the harmless error option is unavailable, so that the only 
way not to reverse is to hold that no error occurred in the first place.  It is 
this dynamic that may render appellate courts less inclined to recognize 
structural errors, for which reversal is mandatory, than non-structural errors, 
for which the harmless-error release valve is at least sometimes available.  
In this way, the automatic reversal rule may end up diluting, rather than 
strengthening, structural protections. 
But so what?  Perhaps it is just an unchangeable fact of the world 
that appeals court judges are disinclined to reverse convictions on supposed 
“technicalities.” And, from the perspective of a criminal defendant, whether 
appellate judges avoid reversals by declaring that no error occurred or by 
                                                
63  Levinson, supra note ?, at 891 (“Automatic reversal is obviously a rather severe 
remedy for any criminal case”); Shepard, supra note ?, at 1183 (highlighting examples of 
cases in which courts have “weakened” structural rights “to avoid applying the drastic 
remedy of automatic reversal”). 
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declaring that an error was harmless, seems beside the point.  From a 
broader societal perspective, moreover, the difference may also seem to be 
of little consequence.  True, making harmless error analysis available for 
structural claims would lessen the pressure on judges to define the 
substantive law narrowly.  But permitting judges to deem one-time 
structural errors as harmless ones would also result in the denial of the 
reversal remedy to some defendants who might have prevailed under a pro-
structural-error regime.  The right would expand while the remedy 
contracted, with the sum availability of appellate relief remaining much the 
same. 
This analysis of the structural error doctrine, however, overlooks its 
distinctively problematic spillover effects.  The difficulty is that the rights-
limiting effect of the automatic reversal remedy feeds back into trial court 
resolution of structural claims. In contrast to appellate courts, which resolve 
claims of trial error after the fact, trial courts resolve most claims as they 
arise.  Consequently, the remedial consequences of recognizing an error at 
trial are less severe than doing so on appeal.  If, for instance, a trial court 
finds that testimony violates a hearsay rule, it can simply strike the 
testimony from the record.  If it finds that physical evidence was unlawfully 
obtained, it can prohibit introduction of the evidence.  If it finds that a juror 
has behaved improperly, it can replace that juror with an alternate.  In each 
of these instances, the substantive error gets remediated without significant 
disruption to the case itself.  For the appellate judge, however, these same 
errors point to one and only one remedial option: reversing the conviction 
outright, so as to require an entirely new trial. 
Thus we encounter another instance of cross-remedial spillover.  
When the high remedial costs of automatic reversal prompt an appellate 
court to declare that no trial error occurred, the appellate court creates 
precedents that trial courts must follow, even though trial courts operate in a 
setting where the same claims of error are far less costly to vindicate.  
Considerations specific to the remedial request for appellate reversal, in 
other words, threaten to produce a weaker set of legal protections than what 
trial court judges might otherwise be willing to endorse. 
Consider Batson v. Kentucky’s prohibition on race-based 
peremptory challenges. Batson errors are structural errors, mandating 
automatic reversal on appeal.64  This state of affairs has likely narrowed the 
scope of Batson protections, with appellate courts, in Professor Pamela 
Karlan’s words, “surreptitiously redefin[ing] the right” to avoid the costly 
                                                
64 The Supreme Court has never expressly declared that Batson errors are structural, 
but lower courts have unanimously characterized them as such.  See Jason Mazzone, 
Batson Remedies, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1613, 1618 n.28 (2012). 
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remedy of automatic reversal and full-scale retrials.65  But remediating 
Batson errors at trial is cheap; the judge need only respond to a violation by 
prohibiting the exclusion of a challenged juror, or empaneling a new jury 
before the trial begins.66  Left to their own devices, then, trial courts might 
give Batson more bite than appellate courts have accorded it.  Instead, these 
courts must take their guidance from their appellate-court counterparts, who 
adjudicate Batson claims in connection with high-cost remedial requests.67 
Another example involves the Sixth Amendment right to public 
trial.  Most appellate courts regard this right as structural,68 meaning that 
they cannot avoid automatic reversals by invoking the harmless error rule.  
Perhaps for this reason, several courts have grafted a “triviality exception” 
onto the right itself.69  Thus, as the D.C. Circuit has explained, even 
unjustified exclusions of the public from trial-level proceedings may not 
violate the Constitution, so long as these closures do not infringe the 
“values served by the Sixth Amendment.”70  Although the court has insisted 
that applying this triviality exception does not equate to conducting 
harmless error analysis,71 the two tests operate in similar ways.  Both seek 
to screen out Sixth Amendment harms of insufficient severity to warrant 
reversal of a conviction on appeal.  Nevertheless, a non-trivial difference 
marks the two rules.  Unlike the harmless error doctrine, which governs 
only the availability of the reversal remedy, the “triviality exception” 
governs the availability of all potential remedies linked to the public trial 
right.  Thus, for example, if a trial judge realizes that members of the public 
were improperly excluded from a portion of voir dire proceedings, the 
                                                
65 Karlan, supra note ?, at 2020. 
66 See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Batson Ethics for Prosecutors and Trial Court Judges, 73 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 475, 500 (1998) (“There will always be a reluctance to reverse a 
conviction because the costs of retrying any case are high.  Trial court actors, not faced 
with those costs, can actually afford to be more singleminded in their devotion to the 
Constitution—if they want to be.”).  For a survey and discussion of the various ways in 
which trial judges have remediated Batson violations, see Mazzone, supra note ?, at ?. 
67 There is, to be sure, some play in the joints here.  Citing Professor Karlan’s work, 
Daryl Levinson has suggested that, in fact, “the Batson right as applied by trial judges, with 
a mild remedy, is significantly more expansive than the Batson right as applied by 
appellate judges, with a severe remedy.”  Levinson, supra note ?, at ?.  If correct, such data 
would reveal that Batson law has been unknowingly disaggregated across the trial-court 
and appeals-court remedial contexts, with the former adhering to a more robust version of 
the doctrine than the latter.  Even so, the data would not disprove the existence of cross-
remedial spillover; perhaps trial judges are still enforcing the Batson right less generously 
than they would be in the absence of the appellate court guidance they currently receive.   
68 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49–50 (1984). 
69 See, e.g., United States v. Perry, 479 F.3d 885, 890–91 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Peterson v. 
Williams, 85 F.3d 39 (1996). 
70 Peterson, 85 F.3d at 43. 
71 See id. at 42. 
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triviality exception might justify her decision not to redo jury selection.  In 
making that decision, however, the judge would be applying a standard that 
appellate courts had developed in the interest of preserving convictions after 
the fact.72   
E.  Probable Cause and the Exclusionary Remedy 
 
What about the exclusionary rule?  Suppression motions can make 
or break a criminal prosecution, with success for the defendant often 
meaning that an obviously culpable criminal goes free.73  While many 
commentators have criticized this aspect of the exclusionary rule as 
resulting in the over-protection of Fourth Amendment rights,74 others have 
attacked it for doing precisely the opposite.  “Judges,” as Professor Akhil 
Amar has explained, “do not like excluding bloody knives.”75  
Consequently, when asked to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment 
grounds, they find ways to “distort doctrine, claiming the Fourth 
Amendment was not really violated.”76  Other scholars have echoed this 
concern,77 and some judges have themselves recognized this play of cause 
and effect.78  Drawing on his own experience on the federal bench, for 
                                                
72 This claim depends on the assumption that trial court judges care more about getting 
the law right than they do about ensuring their judgments don’t get reversed on appeal.  
Otherwise, a “triviality exception” to the public trial rule would render our hypothetical 
judge no more inclined to remediate a minor infringement of the right than would a rule 
providing for harmless error analysis on appeal.  To a purely results-oriented judge, both a 
triviality exception to the right and a harmless error exception to the remedy reduce the 
likelihood of reversal on appeal, and neither rule would therefore motivate the judge to 
remediate a public trial violation immediately after it occurred.  But for judges, who seek 
compliance with the substantive law for its own sake, the impact of an exception to the 
public trial right would be more pronounced than an exception to the reversal remedy on 
appeal. 
73 People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.). 
74 Id. (suggesting that, under an exclusionary regime, “protection for the individual 
would . . . be gained at a disproportionate loss of protection for society”). 
75 Amar, supra note ?, at 799. 
76 Id.  
77 Randy E. Barnett, Resolving the Dilemma of the Exclusionary Rule: An Application 
of Restitutive Principles of Justice, 32 EMORY L.J. 937, 959–66 (1983); Jack Wade Nowlin, 
The Warren Court’s House Built on Sand: From Security in Persons, Houses, Papers, and 
Effects to Mere Reasonableness in Fourth Amendment Doctrine, 81 MISS. L.J. 1017 (2012); 
Leong, supra note ?, at 431; John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural 
Reform Revisited, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1387, 1407 (2007); Tonja Jacobi, The Law and 
Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585, 656–60 (2011). 
78 Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary 
Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 76 (1992) (drawing on 
survey responses from judges and lawyers to suggest that “that judges in Chicago often 
knowingly credit police perjury and distort the meaning of the law to prevent the 
suppression of evidence and assure conviction”). 
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example, Judge Guido Calabresi has stated that the exclusionary rule “has 
been the reason for more diminutions in privacy protection than anything 
else going on today”79 
In addition to judges’ visceral (and some would say understandable) 
reluctance to grant remedial windfalls, the suppression remedy presents a 
further deterrent to the recognition of Fourth Amendment violations: 
hindsight bias.  If judges are like the rest of us, then they will have a hard 
time preventing their ex post knowledge about the outcome of a search from 
affecting what is supposed to be an ex ante inquiry into its lawfulness.80  
And that poses an especially acute problem in criminal cases, where the 
only searches that come up for Fourth Amendment review have already 
yielded incriminating evidence.81  Try as judges might to ignore the fact of 
a search’s success, they may still sometimes succumb to hindsight bias in 
asking whether agents had probable cause to conduct the search in the first 
place.  In Professor William Stuntz’s words, “It must be much harder for a 
judge to decide that an officer had something less than probable cause to 
believe cocaine was in the trunk of a defendant’s car when the cocaine was 
in fact there.”82  And if that is so, the suppression remedy will produce a 
narrowed set of Fourth Amendment protections, especially where probable 
cause determinations are involved. 
An oft-cited cost of these phenomena is the underdeterrence of 
police misconduct.  The longer the exclusionary remedy remains the 
primary means of Fourth Amendment enforcement, the more littered with 
loopholes the right will become, and law enforcement officers will become 
freer to impinge on individual privacy interests.  But there is a further cost 
                                                
79 Calabresi, supra note ?, at 112. 
80 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Foreword: The Death of Probable Cause, 73 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. (Summer 2010), at iix (“Ample psychological theory and empirical data, 
albeit mostly in other contexts, supports the idea that hindsight bias is at work in the 
probable cause determination”); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, 
Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 802–04 (2001) (finding experimental 
evidence of hindsight bias in judges’ assessment of hypothetical Rule 11 sanctions issue); 
Jonathan D. Casper, Kennette Benedict & Jo L. Perry, The Tort Remedy in Search and 
Seizure Cases: A Case Study in Juror Decision Making, 13 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 279, 299 
(1988) (finding evidence of hindsight bias in test jurors’ assessment of hypothetical 
searches).  But see Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlninski, & Andrew J. Wistrich, Can 
Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information?  The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 
U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1313–17 (2005) (presenting experimental evidence indicating that 
judges may be resistant to hindsight bias in evaluating searches for probable cause); Jeffrey 
J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Probable Cause, Probability, and 
Hindsight, Vanderbilt Public Law Research Paper No. 11-25 (July 2011) (similar), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1877125. 
81 See Slobogin, supra note ?, at 403. 
82 Stuntz, supra note ?, at 912. 
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as well, which involves cross-remedial spillover in Fourth Amendment 
lawmaking.  The exclusionary rule is not the only mechanism for enforcing 
Fourth Amendment rights.  Litigants may also raise Fourth Amendment 
claims in connection with requests for prospective or monetary relief.  In 
addition, magistrate judges review warrant applications before deciding 
whether or not to authorize a search.  Cross-remedial application of Fourth 
Amendment law might well expose these remedial environments to the 
right-limiting influences of the exclusionary rule. 
 Consider, for instance, the interplay between after-the-fact 
suppression hearings and before-the-fact evaluations of warrant 
applications.  Warrant proceedings do not present all of the rights-
constricting tendencies that affect after-the-fact decisions about the 
exclusionary remedy.  Ex ante review of a search warrant application raises 
only the attenuated possibility that denying the warrant at that time will 
preclude the government from later prosecuting a criminal—the reviewer, 
after all, does not know whether the search will bear fruit (or whether some 
later investigatory effort will turn up the evidence in any event)—whereas 
ex post review of a suppression motion presents the certainty that 
invalidating the search means withholding inculpatory evidence from a 
jury’s eyes.  For this reason, as Professor Stuntz once surmised, it may well 
be that in unsettled areas of law, “magistrates apply a higher standard to 
warrant applications before the fact than do judges in suppression hearings 
after the fact.”83 But it also must be, that once the law is settled, appellate 
and trial judges will apply the same settled law—settled law that comes 
from the hands of appellate courts that act with the exclusion of evidence in 
mind.  In other words, magistrate judges’ probable cause determinations 
must comport with Fourth Amendment precedents their superiors have 
created, and these precedents often involve requests to suppress probative 
evidence.  The remedy-specific influences of the exclusionary rule, 
combined with the cross-remedial uniformity of Fourth Amendment law, 
would thus render magistrates’ review of warrants less rights-protective 
than they otherwise would and should be. 
 That, in any event, is the prima facie case for attributing cross-
remedial spillover effects to the exclusionary rule.  But the case requires 
some hedging, for two reasons.  To begin, and as I will discuss further in 
Parts III and IV, the remedial and substantive rules in the Fourth 
Amendment context have already developed some safeguards against 
spillover.  The Supreme Court, for instance, has carved out various 
exceptions to the exclusionary remedy, which, framed in terms of the 
remedy rather than the right, allow courts to deny exclusionary relief 
                                                
83 Id. at 937. 
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without affecting Fourth Amendment protections in other remedial settings.  
Thus, while the exclusionary rule is theoretically capable of generating 
cross-remedial spillover effects, the law of evidentiary exclusion may have 
evolved to a point at which cross-remedial spillover no longer presents a 
serious problem. 
 Second, it may be incorrect to presume that magistrate judges who 
review warrant applications ex ante would develop a stricter set of probable 
cause requirements if left to their own devices. To be sure, the ex ante 
warrant application process does not raise the specter of hindsight bias, and 
it also involves a “remedy” (namely the denial of a warrant application) that 
imposes fewer costs on the government than the outright suppression of 
evidence.  (In particular, denial of a search warrant does not free a criminal 
defendant; it simply causes law enforcement officers to develop a stronger 
evidentiary basis for their suspicions.)  At the same time, the warrant- 
application setting may present its own set of rights-deterring forces.  Most 
importantly, these proceedings are ex parte affairs, with repeat-players on 
the government side arguing unopposed for the granting of a warrant 
application.84  In addition, officers may sometimes file warrant applications 
in the course of urgent, high-pressure investigations, in which even a one-
off denial might preclude the government from obtaining valuable evidence 
or preventing a dangerous suspect from doing further harm.85  In these 
circumstances, even marginally meritorious warrant applications would 
enjoy a high likelihood of success, perhaps even more so than government 
attempts to defeat suppression motions ex post.  For all of its supposed 
hostility to Fourth Amendment rights, then, post-search decisions involving 
the exclusionary remedy may be more conducive to the recognition of 
Fourth Amendment protections than a magistrate’s review of warrant 
applications.  And, if that is so, then the exclusionary remedy would not be 
responsible for causing, via spillover, an artificial narrowing of magistrate-
level Fourth Amendment law.  
 With these two caveats in mind, however, it still seems fair to say 
that the remedy-specific forces of the suppression-hearing context might 
sometimes render judges considering suppression motions less likely to 
vindicate Fourth Amendment rights ex post than judges considering warrant 
applications ex ante.  And, in any event, even if the exclusionary remedy 
does not cause major spillover problems within the warrant-application 
context, it may still artificially constrict the availability of other Fourth 
Amendment remedies, such as monetary and prospective relief for the 
                                                
84 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (providing for ex parte review of warrant applications). 
85 The “exigent circumstances” exception to the warrant requirement should reduce the 
number of applications filed under emergency circumstances, but law enforcement officers 
might sometimes wish to err on the side of caution. 
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victims of unlawful searches and seizures.  In sum, spillover problems 
caused by the exclusionary remedy at least present a risk worth attending to.  
As long as the exclusionary remedy remains the primary means of enforcing 
Fourth Amendment protections, and insofar as the Fourth Amendment right 
applies uniformly across remedial contexts, the rights-weakening forces 
associated with the exclusionary remedy will threaten to blunt the impact of 
the Fourth Amendment in cases that have nothing to do with the 
suppression of evidence. 
 
F.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Doctrinal Borrowing 
 
The preceding examples have illustrated cross-remedial spillover 
occurring within single discrete areas of doctrine.  Yet similar forms of 
spillover can also occur as a result of explicit acts of doctrinal “borrowing.” 
This practice, as Professors Nelson Tebbe and Robert Tsai have defined it, 
occurs when courts “import doctrines, rationales, tropes, or other legal 
elements from one area of constitutional law into another for persuasive 
ends.”86  The basic idea is straightforward:  When separate doctrinal 
domains confront analogous problems, courts can reference their prior work 
from one domain to facilitate their present work in another.  And this 
process can give rise to spillover across remedies.  
Consider, for instance, the relationship between the Sixth 
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and state-based attorney 
malpractice law.  In Polk County v. Dodson, the Supreme Court foreclosed 
the use of civil § 1983 actions to remediate Sixth Amendment violations by 
state public defenders, thus effectively channeling all federal ineffective 
assistance adjudication to collateral attacks on final criminal convictions.87   
Consequently, Sixth Amendment case law has evolved in close association 
with the habeas remedy itself, with considerations of finality and interstate 
comity exerting a powerful influence on courts’ disposition of ineffective 
assistance claims. Simply put, courts often conflate the substantive validity 
of an individual’s ineffective assistance claim with the remedial propriety of 
granting habeas relief. 88 
                                                
86 Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 
461 (2010). 
87 See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) (prohibiting the use of 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 to remedy ineffective assistance claims against public defenders); see also Massaro v. 
United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003) (holding that an ineffective assistance claim arising 
from federal convictions may be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 regardless of whether it 
could have been raised on direct appeal). 
88 For instance, the Court in Strickland v. Washington defended its adoption of a 
“prejudice” requirement for ineffective assistance claims by explaining that the 
nonprejudicial errors would not undermine third-party “reliance on the outcome of the 
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Standing alone, none of this is necessarily problematic. Dodson has 
effectively isolated ineffective assistance litigation to the habeas context, so 
Sixth Amendment adjudication presents no other remedial regime for the 
remedy-specific influences of the habeas remedy to spill over into.  With no 
other remedies on the table, it makes no difference (from the spillover 
perspective) whether courts channel their reluctance to grant relief into 
substantive Sixth Amendment doctrine, or into remedy-specific rules of 
habeas doctrine.   For even if remedy-specific influences end up affecting 
the scope of the Sixth Amendment right, very few (if any) Sixth 
Amendment cases will arise in which these remedy-specific influences 
won’t already be present.   
Nevertheless, spillover has arisen as a result of state courts’ decision 
to “borrow” from the constitutional ineffective assistance standard in 
shaping their own standards of attorney malpractice liability.89  This act of 
borrowing, some have argued, unfairly stacks the deck against malpractice 
plaintiffs. Federal ineffective assistance claims virtually always arise in 
connection with collateral attacks on criminal convictions. And in these 
contexts, as one commentator has pointed out, “[t]he institutional and 
societal interest in the finality of convictions may create a reluctance to 
reverse a conviction even where the awarding of damages would be 
appropriate.”90  In this way, the “borrowing” of constitutional effective 
assistance doctrine within state malpractice law creates undesirable 
spillover, rendering malpractice law more disadvantageous to plaintiffs than 
it otherwise would be.91  Even though nominally separate substantive 
                                                                                                                       
proceeding,” 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984).  It also rejected an alternative standard as 
“inadequate because it provides no way of deciding what impairments are sufficiently 
serious to warrant setting aside the outcome of the proceeding,” id. at 693 (emphasis 
added).  These and other aspects of the Strickland decision have led some commentators to 
characterize it as conflating questions of right and remedy. See, e.g., Michael M. O’Hear, 
Bypassing Habeas: The Right to Effective Assistance Requires Earlier Supreme Court 
Intervention, 25 FED. SENT. R. 110 (2012) (characterizing Strickland “as part of the line of 
habeas cases that were intended to minimize meddling by federal courts with state court 
judgments (especially death sentences).”); Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, 
Conceding Guilt, 23 FALL CRIM. JUST. 57, 58 (2008) (suggesting that in Strickland “the 
contours of a violation of rights and the question of remedy bec[a]me confused”). 
89 For example, some states apply claim preclusion rules that prohibit the bringing of 
malpractice claims against attorneys whose conduct has already withstood a Strickland 
challenge in a criminal case. See generally Meredith J. Duncan, Criminal Malpractice: A 
Lawyer’s Holiday, 37 GA. L. REV. 1251, 1270–71 (2002); Susan M. Treyz, Note, Criminal 
Malpractice: Privilege of the Innocent Plaintiff?, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 719, 720 (1991). 
90 Treyz, supra note ?, at 721; see also Duncan, supra note ?, at 1271 (“Although there 
is obviously value in the preservation of judicial resources, courts are wrong in concluding 
that ineffective assistance of counsel claims and criminal malpractice claims require 
equivalent findings in every instance.”).  
91 Nor does “spillover” occur exclusively across remedial boundaries; indeed, the 
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domains, constitutional ineffective assistance standards and common law 
malpractice standards have begun to merge into a single substantive 
standard with cross-remedial scope.  
 
*** 
Remedial law and substantive law, as we have seen, are 
interdependent; the former dictates not just the real-world efficacy of the 
latter, but also, to a large extent, its shape and scope.  That reality, in my 
view, is inevitable—and not necessarily unfortunate.  As a conceptual 
matter, it is hard to think about rights apart from the real-world 
consequences of their existence.92  Further, the interplay between remedy-
related variables and rights-related decisions often makes sense.93  Some 
scholars, for instance, applaud the rule of lenity, citing the particular 
dynamics of the criminal setting as a legitimate reason to construe criminal 
statutes narrowly.94  More controversially, one might applaud, or at least 
refrain from condemning, judges’ contraction of substantive constitutional 
protections in response to exclusionary remedy.  If indeed it is undesirable 
to let the “criminal . . . go free because the constable blundered,” some level 
of substantive narrowing may be an appropriate response to an especially 
                                                                                                                       
phenomenon will arise any time contextual factors affect the definition of doctrinal rules 
that govern when these contextual factors are absent.  “Spillover across space” might 
occur, for instance, when constitutional rights are defined in cases involving state 
government, but then govern in subsequent cases involving the federal government, see, 
e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 189 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (worrying that the Court 
had “dilute[d] a federal guarantee in order to reconcile the logic of ‘incorporation,’ the ‘jot-
for-jot and case-for-case’ application of the federal right to the States, with the reality of 
federalism.”); see also See Marc D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring 
Constitutional Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1516 (2005).   Or “spillover across 
time” might occur when stare decisis causes a holding from Time A to maintain operative 
effect at a later Time B, at which point the holding might no longer make sense.  See, e.g. 
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 413 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(advocating for a relaxation of stare decisis principles in the face of changed 
circumstances, so as to ensure that ““this court . . . bring its opinions into agreement with 
experience and with facts newly ascertained”).  Some of what this Article has to say about 
the spillover problem as applied to cross-remedial rules might then carry implications for 
cognate forms of spillover within other areas of the law.  
92 See Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 678–79 (1983) (“The 
prospect of actualizing rights through a remedy . . . makes it inevitable that thoughts of 
remedy will affect thoughts of right, that judges’ minds will shuttle back and forth between 
right and remedy.”). 
93 Cf. Fallon [Va. L. Rev.], supra note ?, at 692 (concluding that “there should be no 
normative objection to courts openly seeking to achieve the optimal balance of merits, 
justiciability, and remedial doctrines as long as they deal responsibly with such legally 
pertinent considerations as the constitutional text and judicial precedent”).   
94 See, e.g., Price, supra note ?, at 910–25; Solan, supra note ?, at 59–60. 
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potent constitutional remedy.95 
These points suggest that the project of trying to stop remedies from 
affecting the shaping of substantive law is a non-starter.  It does not follow, 
however, that we should ignore the phenomenon altogether.  To the 
contrary, precisely because remedies influence the shape of rights, courts 
must consider the types of substantive outcomes that particular remedial 
regimes favor.  And that is especially so when substantive norms are 
defined in multiple remedial regimes, such that the remedy-specific 
influences of one regime stand ready to spill over into another. 
 
II. NON-DISAGGREGATION RESPONSES  
 
Cross-remedial spillover occurs when two things happen: first, a 
remedial environment influences the definition of a substantive rule; and, 
second, the same substantive rule carries force in a different remedial 
environment.  Efforts to mitigate spillover must therefore target at least one 
of these two events.  That is, courts can combat spillover either by 
calibrating the ways in which remedial dynamics affect the definition and 
implementation of a given substantive rule, or by varying their application 
of substantive rules across different remedial domains. 
This Section identifies and evaluates strategies of the first variety, 
which aim to reduce spillover across remedies without in any way affecting 
the cross-remedial uniformity of substantive legal norms.  I focus in 
particular on three such strategies, which I call (1) “all-contexts” rights 
adjudication; (2) “remedial equalizing”; and (3) “remedial diversifying.” All 
three strategies, we will see, are capable of reducing spillover across 
remedies, by mitigating the extent to which a single remedy distorts the 
cross-remedial application of substantive norms. We will also see, however, 
that all three strategies suffer from significant weaknesses, owing largely to 
their inability to accommodate substantive variation across remedial lines. 
 
A.  “All Contexts” Rights Adjudication 
 
One anti-spillover strategy begins with a call for increased judicial 
awareness of the potential for the spillover problem to happen.  The number 
one evil, on this view, is the judge who adjudicates substantive claims while 
wearing remedial blinders—focusing only on the particular remedial 
request before her without considering how the substantive law she creates 
will operate in other remedial settings.  We thus improve the spillover 
situation by directing judges’ attention to it; the hope is that a greater 
                                                
95 People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926). 
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mindfulness of spillover across remedies will lead to reductions in its 
occurrence. 
This idea has gained traction in the literature on hybrid statutes.  
After recognizing the “core principle” that the meaning of hybrid statutes 
must remain fixed across varying remedial contexts,96 Professor Margaret 
Sachs has encouraged courts to abide by what she calls the “all contexts” 
rule: 
 
In deciding upon the single interpretation [of a hybrid 
statute] courts should not focus solely on the immediate 
enforcement context. Rather, they should apply the all 
contexts rule, which requires them to consider every action 
to enforce the prohibition under the hybrid statute and the 
policies pertinent to each.97 
 
This strategy is reflected in Justice Souter’s plurality opinion in 
Thompson.  Recognizing the National Firearms Act’s potential applicability 
in criminal proceedings, Justice Souter invoked the rule of lenity to resolve 
an interpretive ambiguity, even though the immediate case before him 
presented a request for civil relief.98  The Thompson plurality, in other 
words, interpreted the statute with all remedial contexts in mind.  It did not 
let the remedial particulars of the case interfere with its resolution of a 
cross-remedial substantive question. 
 Although Professor Sachs’s argument applies to hybrid statutes, we 
could extend the “all contexts” principle to other doctrinal areas in which 
spillover occurs.  For instance, we might criticize the Court in Washington 
v. Davis for failing to consider how a discriminatory purpose requirement 
would play out in the criminal setting, just as we might criticize the Court in 
Paul v. Davis for failing to consider how its “stigma-plus” rule would play 
out beyond the confines of constitutional tort cases.  In these and other 
cases, the critical error takes the form of a judicial failure to appreciate the 
cross-remedial nature of the rules being crafted.  When judges define rules 
that traverse remedial boundaries, they ought at least not pretend to be 
doing otherwise. 
 But the “all contexts” approach hardly offers a panacea for 
spillover-related difficulties.  For one thing, the rule seems ill-equipped to 
                                                
96 See Sachs, supra note ?, at 1031; see also FCC v. Am. Broadcasting Corp., 347 U.S. 
284, 290 (1994) (noting, with respect to civil and criminal enforcement of a hybrid statute, 
that “[t]here cannot be one construction for the [FCC] and another for the Department of 
Justice”). 
97 Id. 
98 Thompson, 594 U.S. at 617. 
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handle the variety of subtle ways in which remedies influence the shaping 
of substantive law.  Many of the examples we encountered in Part I reveal 
remedial particularities that exert a quiet, unconsidered effect on courts’ 
adjudication of rights-related claims.  When that is the case, a renewed 
commitment to all-contexts rights adjudication does not seem likely to 
ameliorate the initial distortions that remedies are creating.  Telling courts 
when and when not to apply the rule of lenity is one thing; but telling them 
when and when not to suffer from hindsight bias—or when not to blanch at 
the prospect of reversing a conviction for structural error—is altogether 
different.99  These tendencies are hardwired into human psychology.  
Trying to consider “all remedial contexts” in the face of these impulses 
seems no less futile than trying not to feel them in the first place. 
 A second and more severe shortcoming with the “all contexts” 
strategy lies in its inability to mediate between the competing needs of 
different remedial domains.  We saw in our earlier analysis of Thompson 
that the plurality’s resolution of the issue was in one sense unsatisfactory; it 
did account for all remedial contexts, but only in a way that favored the 
remedial influences of the criminal context over the civil context.  That fact 
should not surprise us, because the plurality was trying to adopt a one-size-
fits-all solution for two very different remedial domains.  As long as rights-
based law must apply uniformly across remedial contexts, this same basic 
problem will arise.  Suppose, for instance, that having considered all 
remedial contexts, the Court in Washington v. Davis concluded that a 
discriminatory purpose requirement was inapt for criminal proceedings but 
apt for civil proceedings.  What then?  Either the Court would have to stick 
to its guns and adopt a discriminatory purpose requirement, notwithstanding 
the requirement’s clumsy fit with criminal equal protection claims, or it 
would have to discard the discriminatory purpose requirement and initiate 
the parade of horribles in civil cases over which the majority lost so much 
sleep.  Openly embracing the all-contexts approach would at least have 
allowed the Court to choose between the lesser of these two evils.  But 
                                                
99 For example, I earlier suggested that the exclusionary remedy artificially reduces the 
degree to which magistrate judges enforce Fourth Amendment rights at probable cause 
hearings.  See Section I.E supra.  The mechanism is straightforward: (1) circumstances 
unique to suppression hearings deter the finding of Fourth Amendment violations by trial 
and appellate judges; and (2) magistrate judges, operating in the absence of the rights-
contracting features of suppression hearings, must nonetheless take their cues from the very 
same doctrines their superiors have crafted.  This is an area where “all contexts” rights 
adjudication seems unlikely to solve the spillover problem.  The deterrent forces of the 
exclusionary remedy are powerful and difficult to resist, so merely exhorting trial and 
appellate judges to ignore hindsight bias and to lighten up on criminal defendants will not 
much improve the situation. 
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doing so would not have made the evils go away.100 
 
B.  Remedy Equalizing 
 
A second response to the spillover problem might involve the 
manipulation of remedies themselves.  When one remedial rule produces 
significant substantive distortions in other remedial settings, courts could 
mitigate spillover effects by looking to the structure of the remedy on which 
that rule is based.  If the particularities of one remedial environment are 
interfering with a right’s application in another, then courts could make 
changes to one (or more) of the environments themselves, so as to equalize 
their effects on the definition of substantive norms. 
Assume, for instance, that within Fourth Amendment law, the 
exclusionary remedy causes unwanted spillover into other domains where 
the pressures against vindicating substantive claims are less intense.  In 
response to this problem, we could simply replace the exclusionary remedy 
with something more modest. We could, for instance, introduce a regime 
that channels all Fourth Amendment claims into damages actions under 
Bivens and § 1983;101 we could replace the exclusionary remedy it with an 
administrative damages remedy;102 we could replace it with a sentencing 
reduction remedy;103 we could replace it with enforcement by an internal 
ombudsman;104 and so forth.105  In comparison to the exclusionary remedy, 
these and other alternative remedies might less severely deter the judicial 
recognition of Fourth Amendment violations.  Consequently, such 
replacement remedies would do less cross-remedial damage to Fourth 
Amendment law, evening out—to some extent—the effects on substantive 
Fourth Amendment law that each applicable Fourth Amendment remedy 
exerts.  This could all be done, moreover, while maintaining absolute 
uniformity within the substantive law itself.  The same Fourth Amendment 
                                                
100 Professor Sachs herself has noted that the “all-contexts” strategy requires will often 
require compromise of one form or another.  See Sachs, supra note ?, at 1034–35 (noting 
that the “policies pertinent to” different remedial regimes can sometimes “conflict”, and 
that when that is the case, “courts should seek the most appropriate compromise”). 
101 See, e.g., Slobogin, supra note ?, at 405–18; L. Timothy Perrin, H. Mitchell 
Caldwell, Carol A. Chase & Ronald W. Fagan, If It’s Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the 
Exclusionary Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 669, 743–55 (1998). 
102 See, e.g., Amar, supra note ?, at 812–15;  
103 See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note ?, at 116–18. 
104 See, e.g., Robert P. Davidow, Criminal Procedure Ombudsman as a Substitute for 
the Exclusionary Rule: A Proposal, 4 TEX. TECH L. REV. 317 (1973); Robert P. Davidow, 
Criminal Procedure Ombudsman Revisited, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 939 (1982). 
105 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note ?, at 969–80 (restitutionary damages remedy); Ronald 
J. Rychlak, Replacing the Exclusionary Rule: Fourth Amendment Violations as Direct 
Criminal Contempt, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 241 (2010). 
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law would apply regardless of whether a claimant sought damages, 
injunctions, sentencing reductions, and so forth.  But spillover would still 
abate as a result of our remedial reforms.  No longer would one Fourth 
Amendment remedy exert disproportionately constricting effects on the 
law’s application within other remedial contexts; instead, Fourth 
Amendment adjudication would occur against the backdrop of remedial 
regimes with more or less equivalent effects on substantive outcomes. 
Here’s another example of how the equalizing strategy might work:  
I earlier suggested that appellate judges will be less likely to identify 
“structural” trial errors on appeal in comparison to trial-level judges 
evaluating structural claims as they arise.  The culprit here is the reversal 
remedy, which renders after-the-fact remediation of a structural error far 
more costly than contemporaneous remediation of the same error at the trial 
level. That being so, Congress could provide for guaranteed interlocutory 
review of all trial-court rulings on structural claims.  Appellate court judges 
would then confront allegations of structural error in a remedial 
environment similar to the one that prevails in the trial court setting.  
Recognizing structural error on appeal would no longer mean vacating the 
outcome of a completed trial; rather, it would mean reversing only a 
particular order issued before a trial has concluded.  Again, the reform 
might help to “equalize” remedial influences on the rights and thereby 
lessen the extent of spillover from one remedial setting to another. 
Even more extreme versions of this strategy might strive to isolate 
the adjudication of substantive norm within one and only one remedial 
setting.  Congress, for instance, could stop passing hybrid statutes, choosing 
between civil or criminal penalties as the sole enforcement mechanism for 
each new substantive norm it enshrines.  Courts could wipe out civil rights 
tort law, by abolishing the Bivens action or overruling Monroe v. Pape,106 
thus in effect relegating the enforcement of constitutional rights solely to 
“defensive” remedies invoked during government-initiated proceedings.  
Congress could jettison the right to an appeal from criminal convictions, 
reasoning that trial-level rights adjudication would thereby become less 
vulnerable to interference from the remedy-specific influences of appellate 
review.  And so forth. 
By now it should be obvious that a “remedy equalizing” strategy 
would mitigate spillover in a highly problematic fashion.  Many objectives 
can, do, and should factor into the design of remedial rules, and only one of 
these objectives is the reduction of spillover across remedies.  Remedies, 
after all, do not exist merely for the sake of influencing courts’ outlook on 
substantive issues; they serve the primary purpose of operationalizing and 
                                                
106 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Monroe v. Pape, 365 
U.S. 167 (1961). 
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enforcing the substantive law on the ground.  Thus, even when concerns 
about spillover might tempt us to scrap one remedial regime in favor of 
another, countervailing considerations might favor a very different 
approach.  Mandatory interlocutory appeals for claims of structural error, 
for instance, might well reduce the extent of spillover that the post-trial 
reversal remedy brings about.  But it would also lengthen the life spans of 
criminal prosecutions, complicating the prompt presentation of witness 
testimony and generating extra judicial work.  In similar fashion, some 
alternatives to the exclusionary remedy—even if less likely to stir up 
spillover effects—might be less effective at deterring law enforcement 
officers from violating core Fourth Amendment guarantees.  Are the 
benefits to be gained from spillover reduction worth the costs to be incurred 
from weakened Fourth Amendment enforcement?  That’s the sort of 
question we should ask when considering whether to pursue large-scale 
abandonment of now-extant remedial structures.  Other considerations 
should also enter into the calculus: What remedial arrangement is fairest to 
the constitutional claimant?  What remedial arrangement best deters 
government misconduct?  What remedial arrangement is most easily 
administered by judges?  And so on.  None of this is to say that we should 
never reform remedies.  Some of the remedial reforms already outlined 
might be well-founded for reasons having nothing to do with the spillover 
problem.  But it is to say that the project of restructuring remedies involves 
a whole lot more than the issue of cross-remedial spillover.  It’s not worth 
launching missiles to kill mice.107  And it may not be worth pursuing large-
scale remedial reforms simply for the sake of curbing spillover across 
remedies. 
 
C.  Remedy Diversifying 
 
A final “non-disaggregation” strategy draws its inspiration from the 
fascinating recent scholarship of Professor Nancy Leong.108  Her core idea 
involves diversifying the remedial regimes in which a given substantive 
right gets adjudicated, so as to improve the overall quality of rights-based 
law.  Her work, to be clear, targets a somewhat different set of problems 
than does this Article.109  But its basic insights might provide the basis for a 
                                                
107 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm’n, 505 U.S. (1992) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
108 See Leong, supra note ?. 
109 As I understand Professor Leong’s argument, the central worry is that the day-in, 
day-out implementation of a substantive norm in the same remedial setting will weaken 
judges’ understanding of the norm itself.  If judges do not adjudicate a substantive rule in 
multiple remedial contexts, Leong posits, they are likely to neglect important interests 
associated with the rule.  See, e.g., id. at 462 (“Rights that emerge through litigation in 
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third anti-spillover strategy, which would attempt to utilize the process of 
cross-remedial spillover against itself. 
Professor Leong has argued that courts and lawmakers should 
deliberately structure procedural and remedial rules to ensure that rights 
adjudication occurs within “multiple contexts.”  That is so, she argues, 
because “when litigation of a particular right takes place only in one 
context, as is the case for many if not most constitutional rights, the inherent 
features of that context begin to distort the right.”110  Single-context rights-
making, among other things, will “tend[] to focus courts on some variables 
at the expense of others,” and will thus generate law that “less thoroughly 
considers the various circumstances in which it will apply” and “less 
compellingly reflects the relationship of particular doctrines to our legal 
regime as a whole.”111  These problems can be avoided, she asserts, if we 
“adjust incentives so that litigation flourishes freely in multiple contexts.”112 
These observations might form the basis of a third anti-spillover 
strategy, which would pursue the diversification of remedial inputs on 
substantive law.  Whereas the “remedy equalizing” strategy seeks to even 
                                                                                                                       
more than one context reflect a richer and more nuanced conception of doctrine.”); id. at 
464 (noting that “single-context rights-making leaves worse off . . . our understanding of 
Fourth Amendment rights”).  Hence arises the need to diversify the remedial settings 
associated with a given right, so as to ensure that judges remain aware of the full panoply 
of interests that the right serves to promote.  This objective would not necessarily require 
courts to apply substantive law uniformly across different remedial contexts—in theory, at 
least, courts could tailor substantive rules according to remedial particularities, while still 
acquiring an improved understanding of the norm itself—but Professor Leong has at least 
implicitly suggested that she envisions “multiple context” adjudication working in concert 
with a single, non-disaggregated body of rights-based law.  See, e.g., Nancy Leong, 
Civilizing Batson, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1561, 1583 (2012) (“Litigation in multiple contexts 
generates better law. Courts see a wider range of interests and circumstances represented, 
and are more likely to craft doctrinal rules that will apply appropriately in all 
circumstances.” (emphasis added)).) 
My concern, by contrast, is with the unwanted spillover that occurs when 
precedent shaped within one remedial context binds judges who would otherwise respond 
differently to cases arising in separate remedial context.  The worry, in other words, is that 
a judge who would like to pursue one particular resolution of a case (and who is fully 
aware of all the interests implicated by a given substantive norm) must sometimes follow 
precedent that derived from considerations related to a totally different set of remedial 
variables.  That worry does not necessarily conflict with Professor Leong’s worry about 
deteriorated judicial understandings of substantive norms.  But my prescribed solution to 
the problem I’ve identified might well undermine her prescribed solution to the problem 
she has identified, at least insofar as the latter requires the uniform application of rights-
based law across divergent remedial settings.  In my view, that would be a trade worth 
making. 
110 Leong, supra note ?, at 407. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
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out each existing remedy’s effect on a substantive rule, this strategy would 
strive simply to increase the number of remedies (notwithstanding their 
divergent influences) that attach to that rule, hoping that over time the 
remedy-specific influences will cancel one another out.  One might say, for 
instance, that the centrality of some remedial contexts tends to exert 
distortive influences on rights-based law—for example, in the manner that 
the habeas remedy tends to the constrict the right to effective assistance of 
counsel—and that’s just always going to be true.  But other remedies, one 
might say, could exert influences in the other direction—for example, in the 
manner that damages remedies under § 1983 might permit more frequent 
judicial declarations that the ineffective assistance right has been violated.  
If both remedies were to enter the picture, each could serve to moderate the 
other’s influence on the ineffective assistance right, thus allowing judges to 
strike a better balance between the competing interests at stake.  Thus, for 
instance, ineffective-assistance claimants in habeas proceedings would have 
more of a fighting chance if they could cite to some ineffective-assistance 
precedents made in § 1983 proceedings, while continued habeas 
adjudication of effective-assistance claims will prevent § 1983 actions from 
creating an effective assistance right that unduly burdens defense attorneys.  
In short, the diversification strategy would allow courts to use spillover to 
their advantage, ensuring that over time, a properly balanced—though still 
uniform—set of substantive rules will emerge.113 
This strategy too, however, presents significant problems. For one 
thing, it is not clear that all remedy-specific influences on substantive rules 
require moderation of the sort that the diversification strategy would 
provide.  Perhaps, for instance, judges in habeas cases are denying 
ineffective assistance claims at an appropriate rate, given the special 
concerns about finality that arise when habeas petitioners seek collateral 
review.  If so, overruling Polk County v. Dodson would not provide a 
necessary corrective to the status quo.114  Or perhaps an expansion of § 
1983 relief would, without more, strike a more appropriate balance between 
the competing interests in this field of law.  In other words, even if the 
Court did reintroduce the § 1983 remedy for ineffective assistance 
violations, we might not wish for lower courts to be relying on habeas-
based ineffective-assistance precedents when adjudicating damages-based 
ineffective assistance claims.  Professor Leong takes it for granted that we 
                                                
113 The idea here is different from the “all contexts” strategy discussed in Section II.A 
infra.  The “all contexts” strategy calls on judges to bear in mind all remedial contexts 
currently associated with a substantive rule, whereas the diversification strategy calls on 
judges (and lawmakers) to increase the number of remedial contexts associated with that 
rule. 
114 See Dodson, 454 U.S. 312. 
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should discourage remedial arrangements that “focus[] courts on some 
variables at the expense of others.”115  But why should that be?  Within 
some remedial settings it may be sensible to downplay the significance of 
some variables and to play up the significance of others.  (Consider, for 
instance, the heightened sensitivity to liberty interests—and concomitantly 
reduced receptivity to government interests—that the rule of lenity reflects 
in criminal statutory interpretation cases.)  And when that is so, the 
conscious pursuit of diversified remedial inputs would serve to frustrate 
rather than facilitate sensible balances that status quo regimes have already 
struck. 
In addition, the diversification strategy might cause one remedy’s 
influence on a substantive rule to overcompensate for another’s.  It is true, 
for instance, that remedy-specific influences might helpfully complement 
one another; but that is not the only possible outcome of the cross-
pollination process that the diversification strategy promotes.  Suppose, for 
instance, that we had concluded that criminal adjudication of Fourth 
Amendment claims is biased in favor of law enforcement interests, whereas 
civil adjudication of analogous claims is biased in favor of privacy 
interests.116 We might envision a salutary averaging process emerging from 
a greater integration of these two remedial contexts, with the pro-
government excesses of the criminal context neutralizing the anti-
government excesses of the civil context (and vice versa). But the process 
might also yield a less happy equilibrium, with the doctrinal influences of 
the one remedial regime overcompensating for (or perhaps totally 
overwhelming) those of the other.  Perhaps, for instance, the diversification 
strategy would repair Fourth Amendment analysis in criminal cases, but 
only at the expense of rendering it too hostile to government interests in 
civil cases.  Or perhaps it will repair Fourth Amendment analysis in civil 
cases, but only at the expense of rendering it too pro-government in 
criminal cases.  It’s hard to know.  Common law adjudication is a path-
dependent process, whose outputs are highly sensitive to small fluctuations 
in the sequencing and frequency of the different inputs it digests.117  So, 
                                                
115 Leong, supra note ?, at 407. 
116 Compare id. at 463 (noting that that criminal adjudication of Fourth Amendment 
claims tends to foreground the “evidence-gathering interest of law enforcement,” while 
giving too little attention to “other interests that may or may not justify the use of force 
during the same police-citizen interaction”), with id. at 450 (speculating that civil 
adjudication of Fourth Amendment claims tends to “skew[] lawmaking by focusing courts’ 
attention on innocent plaintiffs – who may be unrepresentative of all those on whom force 
is used – and on law enforcement interests relating to civilian violence and officer safety – 
which may fail to capture many significant law enforcement interests”). 
117 See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of 
Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 622–50 (2001).   
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while it’s entirely possible that multiple-context rights-adjudication could 
alleviate spillover in helpful ways, the experiment might also backfire. 
Finally, even assuming that the diversification strategy would 
improve the quality of substantive doctrine, there remains the question of 
whether the game is worth the candle.  Increasing the number of remedial 
inputs on substantive law necessarily means increasing the number of 
remedies available to individual litigants, whether through the direct 
introduction of new causes of action, or through indirect reforms to 
immunity doctrines, rules regarding attorneys’ fees, jurisdictional and 
justiciability requirements, and so forth.118  And, so, we must ask: are the 
benefits to be gained from a more holistic, all-things-considered body of 
rights-based law worth the costs that will result from letting more and more 
claimants into the courthouse?  We might worry, among other things, about 
an avalanche of frivolous cases, crowded judicial dockets, and unwanted 
chilling effects on government behavior.119 Even more troubling is the 
danger that the project will create a boomerang effect, as judges faced with 
a significant expansion of constitutional remedies would respond with 
reactionary contractions in the scope of constitutional guarantees.120  These 
bad results—or even the risk of them—may not be worth enduring merely 
to foster the development of a more cross-fertilized body of substantive law. 
 
* * * 
 
 Each of the non-disaggregation strategies that I have outlined in this 
Part suffers from serious problems.  These problems, moreover, stem 
largely from the non-disaggregating nature of the strategies themselves.  
Courts can adjudicate substantive law with “all remedial contexts” in mind, 
but they still must negotiate unsatisfactory compromises between the 
competing needs of different remedial domains.  Courts can “equalize” 
remedial structures, so as to reduce the extent of spillover from one domain 
to another, but by equalizing these structures they will tamper with a whole 
host of other priorities that the structures themselves have been designed to 
promote.  And courts can diversify the remedial settings in which they 
fashion substantive rules, but only by incurring the risk of exacerbating 
rather than ameliorating spillover across remedies.  The strategies all carry 
limited promise, in other words, because they attempt to force different 
sizes of feet into the same shoe. 
                                                
118 See Leong, supra note ?, at 477. 
119 See generally Marin K. Levy, Judging the Flood of Litigation, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2013) (separating out and evaluating the validity of arguments along these 
lines). 
120 Professor Leong herself notes this possibility.  See Leong, supra note ?, at 477. 
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That being so, we should look for productive ways in which to scale 
back the uniform, cross-remedial operation of the substantive law.  Rather 
than target the manner in which particular remedies exert influences on the 
content of particular substantive rules, courts should focus their energies on 
preventing those influences from migrating into remedial environments 
where they would not otherwise have taken hold.  That is, in my view, a 
more promising approach to the problem of spillover across remedies.  It is 
also, as the next section shows, an approach that the law has already begun 
to pursue. 
 
III. DISAGGREGATING SUBSTANTIVE LAW 
 
Though not often admitting to it, courts have sometimes departed 
from the idea that substantive rules should apply uniformly across different 
remedial contexts.  They have most often achieved the departure through 
the development and use of built-in exceptions to remedial rules.  Remedial 
exceptions, I argue, represent the primary means by which courts manage 
cross-remedial spillover.  When, for instance, a court cites the qualified 
immunity rule as the basis for denying a claim for damages under § 1983, it 
leaves itself free to vindicate similar substantive claims raised in connection 
with different remedial requests.  When a court cites the good-faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule as the basis for its denial of a suppression 
motion, the decision leaves open the possibility that identical government 
conduct might still trigger other forms of relief.  And when an appeals court 
cites the harmless error rule as the basis for not reversing a judgment below, 
it leaves trial judges free to remediate identical errors in future cases.  
Remedial exceptions thus enable judges to deny relief in a manner that 
leaves other remedial domains unaffected.  Rather than reject a substantive 
claim on its merits, judges may instead reach for an exception to the remedy 
itself, and thereby create precedent that lacks cross-remedial effect. 
The upshot of all of this is disaggregated rights across remedies.  
With remedial exceptions in place, one substantive claim can trigger some 
forms of judicial relief, but not others.  And that means, in effect, that the 
scope of a substantive norm ends up varying across the different remedies 
used to enforce it.  It is true, of course, that remedial exceptions do not 
inject any formal variation into the substantive law itself (the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule, for instance, does not purport to alter 
Fourth Amendment doctrine proper; it simply says that a certain remedy 
cannot issue when certain Fourth Amendment claims are raised).  But as a 
functional matter, remedial exceptions often exert an unmistakably 
disaggregating effect on substantive legal rules—rendering the same rules 
more or less difficult to remediate depending solely on the type of 
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remediation sought.121  Thus, if we desire to manage spillover by way of 
exceptions to remedial rules, we must also be willing to tolerate cross-
remedial variation in the substantive law.   
 
A.  The Disaggregating Effect of Remedial Exceptions 
 
The disaggregating effect of remedial exceptions is perhaps best 
illustrated by reference to the exclusionary rule.  Not long after Mapp v. 
Ohio did the Court begin identifying types of Fourth Amendment violations 
that did not warrant suppression, and the number of these carve-outs has 
grown over the years.  The suppression remedy is also not available, for 
instance, when officers have placed good-faith reliance on an unlawfully 
issued warrant.122  The remedy is also not available when the officers’ only 
Fourth Amendment violation involves a failure to honor the “knock and 
announce” requirement,123 or when officers have unlawfully acquired 
evidence that would inevitably have been discovered in the absence of the 
Fourth Amendment violation.124  In these and other circumstances, the 
doctrine allows courts to recognize that Fourth Amendment violations have 
occurred while still refusing to furnish exclusionary relief.125 
These exceptions have generally struck commentators as liberty-
reducing.  After all, they deprive constitutional claimants of a remedy for 
violations of their rights, and they cause some future violations to go 
undeterred.126  But these exceptions also further an important liberty-
promoting goal.  If we assume, not unrealistically, that features unique to 
                                                
121 In advancing the claim that remedial exceptions exert a “disaggregating effect” on 
the substantive law, I do not mean to imply that such exceptions change the essentialist 
“meaning” or “content” of substantive norms.  This is a contested issue, compare, e.g., 
Levinson, supra note ?, with Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and 
Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1313–17 (2006).  But it is irrelevant to 
my central point here, which is that remedial exceptions mitigate spillover across remedies 
by varying the applicability of substantive norms across different remedial settings.  I 
believe it is helpful to characterize this phenomenon as involving the “disaggregation” of 
substantive law, but one might just as well characterize it as involving “selective 
withholding” of different remedies from a uniformly defined substantive rule.  The 
disaggregation strategy, in other words, should appeal to pragmatists and essentialists alike, 
though the latter may wish to call it by a different name. 
122 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
123 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006). 
124 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). 
125 See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? 
Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2505–27 (1996). 
126 See id. at 2534 (arguing that “the police are very apt to ‘hear’ the decision rules 
[i.e., remedial rules] that the Supreme Court makes (and that lower federal and state courts 
apply) and thus to adjust their attitudes about what behavior ‘really’ is required by the 
Court’s conduct rules [i.e., substantive rules]”). 
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the suppression-hearing context push judges to err on the side of not 
excluding evidence, then exceptions to the exclusionary remedy permit 
them to achieve this result without affecting the application of search-and-
seizure protections in other remedial environments.  With no remedial 
exceptions in place, judges would be unable to deny exclusion unless they 
held that the government never violated the defendant’s rights.  But when 
exceptions to the exclusionary remedy are available, judges may invoke 
these exceptions to uphold admission of probative evidence, while leaving 
unaltered the substantive content of the Fourth Amendment right itself.  The 
result of the suppression hearing is the same, but its precedential effects are 
different, with the impact of a denial of relief running no further than the 
confines of the remedy itself.127  
Other remedial exceptions do similar work.  Professor John Jeffries 
has argued, for instance, that qualified immunity doctrine—which serves as 
a major exception to § 1983 damages liability—helps to “reduce the cost of 
innovation, thereby advancing the growth and development of constitutional 
law.”128  Professor Jeffries’s argument highlights the cross-temporal 
dynamics of constitutional adjudication:  He aims to demonstrate how the 
qualified immunity defense promotes the adaption of constitutional rights to 
changing circumstances.  His essential insight, however, also suggests how 
immunity rules can and do alleviate spillover across remedies:  Qualified 
immunity doctrine targets not the law of rights but rather the law of 
remedies, and it thereby helps to shield other remedial environments from 
adverse spillover effects.  A similar point holds with respect to the non-
retroactivity rule of Teague v. Lane and other “exceptions” to habeas corpus 
relief; if every expansion of every constitutional guarantee warranted full-
scale retroactive remediation, courts would seldom expand such guarantees 
to begin with.129  But by denying collateral relief through the use of 
remedial exceptions—rather than the narrowing of substantive 
protections—courts can prevent remedy-specific considerations from 
shaping the cross-remedial content of substantive law. 
Remedial exceptions do not formally vary the content of substantive 
rules across different remedial settings.  The same substantive definition of 
                                                
127 This is not to say that remedial exceptions to the exclusionary rule have resulted in 
an overall expansion of Fourth Amendment liberties; the point is only that the exceptions’ 
curtailment of Fourth Amendment liberties has been tempered by their remedy-specific 
scope.  
128 Jeffries [Yale L.J.], supra note ?, at 98. 
129 Jeffries [VA. L. REV.], supra note ?, at 80 n.?  The same is true of AEDPA-based 
restrictions on federal court review of state court convictions, which require significant 
judicial deference to the constitutional determinations of state courts.  See 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(b).  AEDPA deference permits federal court judges to deny habeas relief without 
having to propound restrictive, cross-remedial principles of substantive law.  
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what constitutes probable cause applies, for instance, regardless of whether 
a trial court judge considers a suppression motion or a magistrate judge 
considers an application for a search warrant; it’s just that additional hurdles 
must be cleared in order for the suppression remedy to issue, whereas the 
denial of a warrant application would follow automatically from a 
magistrate’s identification of fatal Fourth Amendment defects.  At another 
level, though, remedial exceptions generate disaggregated substantive law, 
because they produce a world in which Fourth Amendment claims capable 
of generating relief vary according to the type of relief being sought.  The 
Fourth Amendment as applied in the exclusionary setting permits police to 
enter homes without announcing their presence, whereas the Fourth 
Amendment as applied in the § 1983 setting does not.   Likewise, the Fourth 
Amendment as applied in the exclusionary setting permits the unreasonable 
acquisition of evidence that will be inevitably discovered, whereas the 
Fourth Amendment as applied in the warrant-issuing setting does not.  
Similar points can be made about the disaggregating effect of other 
remedial exceptions.  The harmless error rule, for instance, renders 
evidentiary restrictions less exacting when they underlie requests for 
appellate relief than when they underlie requests for trial-level relief.  
Qualified immunity doctrine renders the First Amendment less protective 
when asserted in damages actions against individual public officials than 
when asserted as a defense to criminal prosecution.  And the rules of non-
retroactivity and AEDPA deference yield a far narrower set of operative 
substantive rights with bite in the habeas context, as compared to the 
operative substantive rights with bite on direct appeal. 
In short, remedial exceptions mitigate spillover by severing the 
connection between a decision to withhold application of a remedy and the 
generation of substantive precedents with cross-remedial force.  That is not 
to say that the invocation of such exceptions leaves the substantive right 
unaffected; much to the contrary, as we have seen, remedial exceptions 
carry significant implications for the real-world efficacy of the substantive 
right itself.  But remedial exceptions carry these implications in a remedy-
specific way, leaving unaltered (both formally and functionally) the 
substantive law as it applies in connection with other remedial rules. And 
that is the key to understanding how remedial exceptions alleviate spillover 
across remedies:  The dynamics of a given remedial setting exert influences 
on the outcome of individual substantive cases; but remedial exceptions 
confine these influences to the particular remedial setting that produces 
them. 
 
B.  Limitations 
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So is our work here done?  Was all the above just a roundabout way 
of saying that remedial exceptions have already solved the problem that 
provoked the writing of this Article in the first place?  No.  In their current 
form, many remedial exceptions reveal their share of difficulties as anti-
spillover devices.  These difficulties, to be clear, are not an inescapable 
feature of remedial exceptions in the abstract; we can steer clear of the 
difficulties by modifying the exceptions on the books, rather than giving up 
altogether on the project of avoiding spillover through the strategic use of 
remedial exceptions.  But most (though not all) remedial exceptions take the 
form of broad transsubstantive rules, and this in turn can create problems 
from the perspective of cross-remedial spillover.  In particular, a small set 
of broadly applicable exceptions will fail to capture the full range of 
scenarios in which judges might wish to inject disaggregation into the 
substantive law.  And the transsubstantive nature of these exceptions means 
that judges can create such disaggregation only by creating new forms of 
spillover within the law of remedies itself.   
 
1. Inaptness 
 
Courts do not design remedial exceptions solely with the problem of 
cross-remedial spillover in mind.  Other considerations factor into the 
shaping of standards that dictate when remedial exceptions do and do not 
apply:  When, as a practical matter, is it too difficult to furnish relief?  
What, if anything, do the relevant statutes say?  Would other remedies be 
available to enforce a right if an exception precluded enforcement in this 
remedial context?  And so forth.  Many different—and sometimes 
countervailing—objectives must be considered in mapping out the 
conditions under which substantive violations trigger different kinds of 
remedial action by the courts.  For this reason, a given remedial exception 
may not always work well in guarding against spillover across remedies.   
Consider, for instance, the harmless error rule.  As we have already 
seen, harmless error analysis does not apply to so-called “structural” errors, 
which trigger automatic reversal whenever they occur.  If a court determines 
that a structural error at trial was too insignificant to warrant reversal of a 
conviction, the harmless error exception provides no help.  The only way to 
avoid issuing the remedy is to declare, disingenuously, that no legal error 
ever occurred.  Even beyond structural errors, moreover, there remain 
problems.  Harmless error analysis focuses first and foremost on the 
variable of prejudice; it offers no assistance to judges who wish to affirm 
convictions in the face of errors with prejudicial effects.  Yet there may be 
circumstances in which even prejudicial errors will strike judges as too 
insubstantial to warrant full-bore appellate relief.  (Imagine, for instance, 
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that a trial judge has pushed the boundaries of a hearsay rule, admitting 
evidence that contributed to a jury’s finding of guilt but without offending 
any of the substantive interests that the rule was intended to promote.)  In 
these settings, harmless error analysis and its prejudice-based focus will still 
leave appellate judges reluctant to identify close-to-the-borderline violations 
of the substantive law, even where the primary basis for their reluctance 
derives from considerations specific to the reversal remedy itself. 
Consider, too, damages relief under § 1983 liability.  Under the 
status quo regime, qualified immunity doctrine provides the primary means 
by which courts can avoid imposing damages on public officials, regardless 
of the particular type of claim asserted against them.  Thus, for instance, 
had the Court wished to deny relief in Paul v. Davis without affecting the 
cross-remedial content of procedural due process doctrine (and without 
creating a new exception to the § 1983 damages remedy), it could have 
invoked the qualified immunity exception:  Rather than holding that the 
defendant did nothing wrong as a matter of procedural due process law, the 
Court could have disposed of the case by declaring that the defendant never 
violated a clearly established constitutional right.130  But invoking qualified 
immunity in Paul would not have assuaged the Court’s concerns about 
converting the Fourteenth Amendment into a “font of tort law.”  That 
alternative rendering of Paul would have left lower courts free to establish 
new procedural due process requirements in future Paul-like cases, and 
those requirements, once clearly established, would have empowered future 
§ 1983 plaintiffs to secure damages relief against public officials who ran 
afoul of them.  A qualified immunity holding, in other words, would have 
worked to insulate the Paul defendants from damages liability under § 
1983, but not future defendants in similar cases.  Given what remedial 
exceptions were then at its disposal, the Court in Paul could thus have 
concluded that the only way to foreclose defamation-like tort actions under 
the Due Process Clause was to render a cross-remedial decision about the 
constitutional right itself. 
Or, take the exclusionary remedy.  Punctuated as it already is with 
exceptions, the remedial law of exclusion may still not account for the full 
range of circumstances in which a judge’s reluctance to exclude evidence 
renders her unwilling to declare that a violation of the law occurred.  A 
search or seizure may not trigger any current exception to the exclusionary 
rule, but if the unlawfully obtained evidence is probative enough, the 
alleged violation insignificant-seeming enough, and the societal interest in 
securing a conviction strong enough, then a judge may still be looking for a 
way out of the troublesome task of furnishing relief.  Under such 
                                                
130 See Jeffries [VA. L. REV. 47], supra note ?, at 79 n.115. 
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circumstances, remedial exceptions will fail to prevent cross-remedial 
spillover; with no ready-made exception at the judge’s disposal, the likely 
outcome of the case will be a declaration that the government at all times 
comported with the law. 
None of this is to say that the current smorgasbord of exceptions 
within these and other remedial domains is wholly ineffective at mitigating 
spillover across remedies.  Without these exceptions in place, the 
substantive protections of cross-remedial law would be narrower than what 
the status quo provides.  But utilizing the exceptions on the books to combat 
the particular problem of cross-remedial spillover can sometimes feel like 
trying to fit square pegs into round holes.  The status quo regime presents 
courts with a small number of remedial exceptions designed to resolve a 
large number of very different cases; these exceptions may therefore fail to 
capture each and every instance in which the remedial dynamics of a case 
militate against the granting of relief.  Consequently, even for remedies with 
exceptions already attached to them, the threat of spillover remains.  
 
2. Transsubstantivity 
 
A further complication with remedial exceptions involves their 
generally transsubstantive character.  Just as substantive rights tend to apply 
uniformly across remedies, so too does the law of remedies tend to apply 
uniformly across substantive rights.  Qualified immunity protections do not 
change depending on whether a § 1983 plaintiff alleges a Fourteenth 
Amendment violation or an Eighth Amendment violation;131 the harmless 
error standard does not change depending on whether a trial court 
misapplies the Fourth Amendment or the Fifth Amendment;132 and, with a 
few exceptions,133 the same nonretroactivity restrictions on habeas corpus 
relief apply across a wide variety of substantive claims. The 
                                                
131 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. [Fordham L. Rev.], supra note ?, at 490; Jeffries [Yale 
L.J.], supra note ?, at 259. 
132 The standard does change, however, depending on whether a defendant asserts a 
constitutional or nonconstitutional claim.  See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) 
(setting forth an elevated standard for harmless error review in connection with claims of a 
constitutional nature).  Although I have elsewhere criticized this feature of the doctrine, my 
criticisms focus on the constitutional/nonconstitutional distinction itself, as opposed to the 
more general idea of varying harmless error requirements across different substantive 
domains.  See Michael Coenen, Constitutional Privileging, 99 VA. L. REV. 683, 695–97 
(2013). 
133 See Teague, 489 U.S. at 311  (withholding “new rule” requirement from 
“watershed” rulings of criminal procedure and laws that place “certain kinds of primary, 
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law to proscribe”); see also 
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998) (holding that Teague does not apply to 
decisions narrowing the scope of substantive criminal statutes). 
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transsubstantive nature of these and other remedial exceptions renders them 
a problematic means of attacking cross-remedial spillover. 
Suppose, for instance, that on an appeal from a conviction, a 
criminal defendant argues that the trial judge unlawfully admitted some 
piece of hearsay testimony proffered by the prosecution.  Suppose, 
moreover, that, while both the merits of the claim and the harmless error 
analysis present a close call, the appeals court panel feels strongly that the 
trial court’s alleged violation of the hearsay rule should not trigger the 
windfall remedy of a new trial.  The panel’s outlook on the case, in other 
words, stems from a mixture of remedy-based and substance-based 
considerations:  The judges agree that the alleged violation of the hearsay 
rule—if in fact a violation—did not amount to a serious enough legal error 
to warrant the high remedial costs that a retrial would entail.  
Having made up its mind that it wants to affirm the conviction, the 
panel then asks how to reach this result.  Should the panel hold that the trial 
judge’s admission of the hearsay testimony did not violate an evidentiary 
rule?  Or should it hold that the admission of the hearsay testimony—
whether or not erroneous—was harmless to the defendant?  Much of what 
I’ve argued thus far would favor the latter route: The panel’s reluctance to 
reverse derives from considerations unique to the context of appellate 
review, so rejecting the claim on its merits would result in cross-remedial 
precedent that binds judges at both appellate-court and trial-court levels.  
All else equal, then, the court would do better to affirm via the harmless 
error exception, thereby obviating the risk of spillover across remedies. 
All else, however, may not be equal.  For if the panel decides to 
invoke the harmless error rule, it runs the risk of creating spillover in a 
different direction: across rights.  The harmless error rule, recall, is 
generally transsubstantive.  Thus, in denying relief on harmless error 
grounds, the panel creates a new transsubstantive precedent concerning the 
law of harmless error, shaping the analysis that future appellate judges will 
apply in connection with different substantive claims.  That is a problem 
insofar as the original reason for invoking the harmless error rule—and thus 
for contributing to the transsubstantive harmlessness standard—related to 
the substantive particularities of the defendant’s case.  Considerations 
unique to one substantive rule shape a remedial precedent that attaches to 
many other substantive rules. 
To take one further example, suppose a habeas petitioner alleges that 
a recent Supreme Court decision entitles him to retroactive relief.  The 
government disagrees, arguing (a) that the prior decision created a “new 
rule” under Teague and therefore cannot form the basis for any post-
conviction attack; and (b) that even under the new Supreme Court 
precedent, the defendant’s conviction was not the product of legal error. 
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Suppose that both of these issues could go either way, but that the judge 
considering the habeas petition regards the claim as insufficiently important 
to warrant the high-cost remedy of habeas relief.  The same dilemma thus 
presents itself.  The judge can deny the claim on its merits, but he will then 
be allowing considerations specific to the habeas remedy to shape a 
precedent with application in other remedial contexts.  But if the judge 
seeks refuge in the Teague rule, he will then be shaping a transsubstantive 
remedial rule (i.e., the law governing what qualifies as a “new rule” under 
Teague) by reference to considerations specific to the particular substantive 
issue that the petitioner has raised.134  There will be spillover one way or the 
other; the only thing left for the judge to decide is whether to channel it into 
the law of remedies or into the law of rights. 
We can generalize the point:  Transsubstantive remedial exceptions 
facilitate the avoidance of spillover across remedies, but only at the expense 
of spillover across rights. When a court’s motivations to deny relief are 
mixed—that is, grounded in considerations specific to a remedial context 
and considerations specific to a substantive claim—its invocation of a 
transsubstantive exception may therefore not always represent a viable anti-
spillover strategy.  The viability of the strategy will depend on the relative 
degree to which rights-related and remedy-related considerations factor into 
the court’s overall assessment of a claimant’s demands.  The court must 
essentially choose between the lesser of two evils: (a) cross-remedial 
spillover problems caused by a remedy-motivated denial of a substantive 
claim, and (b) transsubstantive spillover problems caused by a substance-
motivated denial of a particular form of relief.  In many cases, these harms 
will be difficult to calculate.  And even where the harms can be calculated, a 
fully satisfactory doctrinal solution may still not emerge. 
 
C.  Better Exceptions? 
 
                                                
134 Consider, for instance, the Court’s recent decision in Chaidez v. United States, 113 
S. Ct. 1103 (2013), where it denied retroactive habeas relief to a petitioner whose counsel 
failed to advise her of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty to a federal crime 
(and thereby rendered ineffective assistance of counsel under Padilla v. Kentucky, 599 U.S. 
356 (2010)).  The Court held in Chaidez that its earlier decision in Padilla created a “new 
rule” of Sixth Amendment law and therefore could not form the basis for retroactive relief, 
notwithstanding strong doctrinal arguments to the contrary.  See Chaidez, 113 S. Ct. at 
1114–21 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  It is impossible to know precisely what motivated the 
Court to deny relief in Chaidez, but one cannot ignore that deeming Padilla “non-new” 
would have called into question a large number of pre-Padilla plea agreements entered into 
by immigrant defendants.  Insofar as this consideration (tethered to the Padilla right itself) 
motivated the Court to deem Padilla “non-new” for purposes of habeas relief, the Court 
would have allowed a substance-specific consideration to dictate the shape of a 
transsubstantive remedial holding, thereby yielding spillover across rights.   
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Nothing in these preceding sections suggests that remedial 
exceptions are inherently unable to combat spillover in an effective way.  I 
have leveled my criticisms at existing features of existing exceptions, and 
responding to these criticisms would therefore not require us to abandon the 
project of crafting exceptions to remedial rules.  Instead, it would require us 
to shape and apply these exceptions in a more substance-specific and finely 
tailored way.135 
Notice, however, that the more finely-tailored and substance-
specific our exceptions become, the harder it is to say with a straight face 
that these exceptions are not in fact varying the cross-remedial applicability 
of the substantive law.  Functionally speaking, there is a vanishing 
difference between layering multiple “substance-specific” remedial 
exceptions atop a formally uniform body of substantive law, and declaring 
straight up that the dictates of the substantive law vary according to the 
remedial environment in which it applies.  Where remedial exceptions are 
few in number and transsubstantive in breadth, we can more plausibly 
identify a conceptual separation between remedial and substantive rules: 
We define the remedy’s availability, theoretically at least, in terms that do 
not depend on substantive criteria, and we may therefore characterize the 
remedial inquiry as totally and completely independent from whatever the 
substantive law provides.  (“All First Amendment requirements,” we can 
plausibly say, “are capable of generating monetary relief against individual 
defendants, but that relief is not available when those same First 
Amendment requirements have not been clearly established.”)  But where a 
larger number of remedial exceptions target substance-specific criteria, this 
no longer becomes the case.  (It does not make much sense to say 
something like: “All Fourth Amendment requirements are capable of 
generating exclusionary relief, but exclusionary relief is not available when 
the Fourth Amendment requirement at issue is the knock-and-announce 
rule.”) 
That observation helps to demonstrate how what might seem a quite 
complex and radical project of reform can actually be achieved in a simple 
and gradual fashion.  Proliferating exceptions within the remedial law and 
associating each exception with precise, substance-specific criteria may 
sound like a daunting task.  But it is really just another way of describing a 
more candid and minimalist approach toward substantive lawmaking, which 
freely blends together the rights-related and remedy-related elements of 
courts’ reasoning.  When remedial variables motivate substantive outcomes, 
                                                
135 Although I am not the first to advocate for reducing the transsubstantivity of 
remedial rules, see, e.g., Fallon [FORDHAM L. REV.], supra note ?, at 489; Jeffries [Yale 
L.J.], supra note ?, at 291–92, the prior work on point has not explicitly focused on the 
spillover-related benefits of doing so.  
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the trick is simply to register these motivating effects within the doctrine 
itself.  Doing so will inject into the precedent a limiting principle that 
permits differentiation in outcomes according to differentiated remedial 
demands.  We can characterize such a decision as creating a new 
“substance-specific exception” to the remedy being sought, or we can 
characterize it as creating a new, remedy-dependent rule of substantive law.  
How we characterize the decision, though, is of far less significance than 
what it allows us to achieve: a more disaggregated set of substantive norms 
that better resists spillover across remedies.136 
A useful template for this sort of “blending” approach involves the 
prior restraint rule of First Amendment doctrine.  In simplified form, the 
rule calls for special First Amendment scrutiny of government efforts to 
secure before-the-fact injunctions against would-be speakers, as compared 
to after-the-fact punishments on persons who have already spoken.  Though 
not without its detractors,137 this rule reflects a common and longstanding 
sentiment that pre-publication restraints on speech are “the most serious and 
the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.”138  And were 
this sentiment not recognized by First Amendment doctrine, we might 
worry about its potential to create cross-remedial spillover.139  Cases 
involving injunctions against speech would—due to the presence of a pre-
speech injunction—generate rules of strict First Amendment protection, 
which would then limit the government’s use of less offensive remedies to 
regulate speech of a similar character.  But the prior restraint rule blocks 
this outcome.  By reifying the idea that pre-publication injunctions against 
speech receive especially strict First Amendment review, the prior restraint 
rule ensures that the precedential effects of prior restraint cases will not run 
beyond the prior restraint context.  Spillover is avoided—and 
disaggregation achieved—by nothing more than a candid judicial 
acknowledgment that substantive and remedial considerations should be 
blended together in a special way.140 
                                                
136 One potential consequence of the characterization we adopt, which I bracket here, 
involves constitutional rights and remedies.  Insofar as some remedies for constitutional 
harms are grounded in nonconstitutional rules of statutory (or common) law, then 
substance-specific rules of “remedial” law might be amendable by statute, whereas 
remedy-specific rules of constitutional law would not be. 
137 See, e.g., Marin Scordato, Distinction Without A Difference: A Reappraisal of the 
Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1989); John C. Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking 
Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409 (1983); William T. Mayton, Toward a Theory of First 
Amendment Process: Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the 
Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 245 (1982). 
138 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390 
(1973). 
139 I am grateful to Geof Stone for bringing this point to my attention. 
140 Other examples from the First Amendment context reveal an analogous approach to 
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 The prior restraint rule thus represents the sort of “remedial 
exception” that effectively targets spillover across remedies.  It is 
particularized and substance-specific.  It blends together substance-based 
and remedy-based considerations.  It therefore yields holdings that apply in 
free-speech cases involving pre-publication injunctions, but not in cases 
involving other speech-related remedies.  With the rule in place, the risk of 
cross-remedial spillover diminishes, as does the spillover risk produced by 
the blunt and transsubstantive remedial exceptions on which courts might 
otherwise end up relying.  Clearly, moreover, the prior restraint rule 
“disaggregates” First Amendment law.  It causes the strength of a speaker’s 
First Amendment claims to fluctuate with the sort of remedy involved in the 
speaker’s case, even keeping constant the content and societal value of the 
speech itself.  And all of that is achieved through the courts’ frank and 
explicit acknowledgment that a particular remedy has affected their outlook 
on a substantive claim.  
 Can courts achieve similar forms of disaggregation within other 
areas of the substantive law?  The next Section considers that possibility. 
 
D.  Further Reforms 
 
Consider first the Court’s decisions in Washington v. Davis and Paul 
v. Davis.  Both decisions alluded to remedy-related reasons for rejecting the 
plaintiffs’ substantive claims.   Neither decision, however, ended up 
yielding the sort of disaggregated law that one might have expected to 
develop.  The Court in Washington v. Davis fretted about the intrusiveness 
and complexity of structural reforms to the welfare state, and it cited these 
difficulties as a reason for ratcheting up the difficulty of demonstrating 
equal protection violations.141  The Court in Paul v. Davis similarly fretted 
about the debilitating effects of damages actions against public officials, 
and it cited these effects as a reason to deny procedural due process 
protections to claimants suffering government-induced reputational 
harms.142  Both analyses thus flirted with a blending together of remedy-
related and rights-related reasoning.  In the end, however, they failed to 
                                                                                                                       
the spillover problem.  In some areas of free-speech doctrine, courts have employed a 
“penalty-sensitive” approach to First Amendment analysis, reflecting the assumption that, 
all else equal, the harmfulness of a speech prohibition rises with the harshness of the 
penalty attached to it.  See Michael Coenen, Of Speech and Sanctions: Toward a Penalty-
Sensitive Approach to the First Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 991 (2012).  By making 
explicit the connection between penalty severity and First Amendment validity, the Court 
helps to prevent variables specific to the nature of one penalty from dictating the First 
Amendment doctrine that governs in cases involving very different penalties. 
141 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976). 
142 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976). 
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produce meaningful cross-remedial variations in the substantive law. 
The better course of action in these cases would have been to 
identify the remedy-specific elements of the legal analysis and—critically—
to leave open the possibility of different substantive outcomes in alternative 
remedial settings. Having noted that special features of the damages remedy 
rendered it less receptive to the substantive claim, the Court in Paul v. 
Davis should have gone on to hold that its “stigma plus” rule might or 
might not warrant application in cases where damages were not at issue.  
Having expressed its concerns about reallocating public resources via 
structural injunctions, the Court in Washington v. Davis should likewise 
have left open the possibility that equal protection claimants might satisfy a 
lesser standard when not seeking civil relief.  Precisely what the law would 
have looked like in these other remedial environments need not have been 
decided then and there; rather, the Court should simply have identified a 
remedy-specific influence on its substantive holding while taking care not 
to imply that the holding controlled within other remedial settings. 
A similar point obtains with respect to hybrid statutes.  Both 
Chiarella and the Court’s holding in Thompson suffered from a judicial 
unwillingness to disaggregate by blending.  When implementing Rule 10b-5 
in civil cases, both the Supreme Court and lower courts failed to highlight 
the linkage between the non-criminal nature of the remedies sought and the 
expansive substantive holdings that these rulings embodied.  Consequently, 
when Chiarella presented the question whether the Rule permitted criminal 
insider trading prosecutions, the prior on-point precedents obscured from 
view an important potential basis for distinguishing them away.  And while 
the Thompson Court did in fact acknowledge a remedial influence on its 
holding, its rigid adherence to cross-remedial uniformity placed it in the 
awkward position of following the rule of lenity in a case with nothing more 
than a $200 tax refund at stake.  The Court could have better managed the 
spillover problem by resolving the statutory issue in Thompson on narrower 
grounds, while emphasizing the remedy-dependent nature of the holding it 
had rendered.  That way, Thompson could have achieved an optimal 
substantive result with respect to civil enforcement of the National Firearms 
Act without interfering with future courts’ handling of criminal cases under 
the NFA. 
The Second Circuit’s decision in United States v. Plaza Health 
Laboratories, Inc. reveals what a more disaggregated approach to hybrid 
statutes might look like.143  The employee of a private laboratory had 
dumped vials of blood into the Hudson River, and the government sought to 
prosecute him for knowingly discharging pollutants in violation of the 
                                                
143 3 F.3d 643 (2d Cir. 1993). 
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Clean Water Act (“CWA”).  The liability question turned on whether the 
dumper of the vials qualified as a “point source” of pollutants under the 
CWA.  (Suffice it to say that the statute’s definition of the term—“any 
discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to 
any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, 
rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other 
floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged”144—
rendered the answer to this question nonobvious.)  And in case the statutory 
question wasn’t already complicated enough, the phrase “point source” 
appeared within both criminal and civil provisions of the CWA, thus 
presenting another variant on the hybrid statute dilemma. 
The Second Circuit dealt with this conundrum just as it should have, 
by blending together the substantive and remedial elements of its reasoning.  
Having consulted the statutory text and legislative history, it concluded that 
the interpretive question presented no obvious answer.145  It then explained: 
 
Since the government’s reading of the statute in this case 
founders on our inability to discern the obvious intention of 
the legislature to include a human being as a “point source”, 
we conclude that the criminal provisions of the CWA did not 
clearly proscribe Villegas’s conduct and did not accord him 
fair warning of the sanctions the law placed on that conduct. 
Under the rule of lenity, therefore, the prosecutions against 
him must be dismissed.146 
 
And so, Villegas won his case, but not by way of a decision 
establishing that the term “point source” excluded human beings for any 
and all remedial purposes.  Rather, he won the case by way of a holding that 
drew together substantive and remedial considerations to produce a remedy-
specific substantive rule:  As the Second Circuit made clear, the CWA’s 
lack of clarity, acting in concert with the rule of lenity, precluded the 
government from criminally punishing humans as point sources.  Nothing in 
the court’s holding, however, barred anyone from seeking civil relief under 
the CWA against polluters like Villegas.147  The court determined that the 
statute wasn’t clear enough to warrant criminal prosecution, but it left open 
                                                
144 Id. at 645 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)). 
145 Id. at 649. 
146 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).  
147 Indeed, the court went out of its way to distinguish several civil cases involving the 
scope of the CWA’s “point source” requirement, explaining that such cases had arisen in 
“civil-penalty or licensing settings, where greater flexibility of interpretation to further 
remedial legislative purposes is permitted, and the rule of lenity does not protect a 
defendant against statutory ambiguities.”  Id. at 648. 
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the question whether the “humans are point sources” argument might carry 
the day in a civil enforcement action.  Plaza Health Laboratories thus 
succeeded where both Thompson and Chiarella failed.  Thus, while 
Villegas’s bloody vials may well have spilled beyond the banks of the 
Hudson, the precedential effects of his case did not spill beyond the 
boundaries of the criminal law. 
Consider, finally, Fourth Amendment probable cause 
determinations.  In Illinois v. Gates, the Court characterized the probable 
cause inquiry as presenting a “commonsense, practical question,” to be 
governed by an “assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—
not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”148  In 
addition, the Court stressed the need for “great deference” to a magistrate’s 
probable cause determinations, explaining that courts should not “invalidate 
warrants by interpreting affidavits in a hypertechnical, rather than a 
commonsense, manner.”149  Put another way, magistrates get to employ an 
indefinite standard while enjoying deferential review.  The consequence, as 
Professor Stuntz explained, is a remedial arrangement that permits 
magistrates (on the one hand) and higher level judges (on the other) to apply 
what in effect amount to “different standards”—standards whose 
differences derive from the different substantive influences that their 
remedial environments present.150 
Stuntz suggested that this arrangement should be regarded as 
sensible and unproblematic from the perspective of those who worry about 
hindsight bias in suppression hearings.  More than that, the arrangement 
might count as positively beneficial.  The Gates approach allows for higher-
ranking courts to uphold magistrates’ probable cause determinations 
without creating new law that binds below.  The precedents generated in 
suppression hearings, in other words, will generally concern remedy-
specific principles of deference, rather than cross-remedial principles of 
Fourth Amendment law.  Consequently, trial courts may deny Fourth 
Amendment claims without inflicting collateral damage on the substantive 
standards that magistrates apply. 
*** 
 To recap the argument thus far:  Remedies influence rights.  Rights 
apply across remedies. Distortions thus arise when a particular remedy 
influences the scope of a substantive rule, which then imports the remedy-
specific influence into other remedial environments.  I have argued that the 
best way to attack the spillover problem is by varying rights’ application 
across different remedial contexts.  To some extent, this is what courts 
                                                
148 462 U.S. 213, 230, 232 (1983). 
149 Id. at 236 (internal citations and alterations omitted). 
150 Stuntz, supra note ?, at 929. 
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already do.  By utilizing exceptions to remedial rules, courts create ways for 
themselves to grant some but not other forms of relief in response to 
otherwise identical substantive claims.  Even so, courts can do a better job, 
by rendering the exceptions they apply more nuanced in definition and less 
transsubstantive in scope.  That can often be accomplished by 
acknowledging directly the remedial elements underlying a substantive 
holding, thus assigning to that holding a precedential impact that extends no 
further than the remedial context in which it was rendered. 
 That may be all fine and good from the perspective of the spillover 
problem itself.  But before we give a thumbs-up to the hidden modes of 
disaggregation that remedial exceptions facilitate, and to the more explicit 
forms of disaggregation that improved remedial exceptions would create, 
we should ask whether the disaggregation strategy fits comfortably within 
the broader legal framework of public law adjudication.  Put another way, 
even if we have proven it an effective means of combating the spillover 
problem, we must still ask whether the disaggregation strategy comports 
with basic values and priorities of the legal system writ large. 
 
IV. IS DISAGGREGATION PROPER? 
 
 I see four major objections to the strategy of disaggregating 
substantive norms across remedial boundaries.  The first objection holds 
that the disaggregation strategy does not reflect the unitary nature of the 
legal texts from which substantive rules derive.  The second objection holds 
that the disaggregation strategy undesirably complicates the law.  A third 
objection (related to the second) holds that disaggregating rights across 
remedies undermines important values associated with the law’s generality.  
And a fourth objection holds that certain (though not all) forms of 
disaggregation will frustrate higher-level courts’ ability to supervise the 
work of their lower-level counterparts.  I address these four objections in 
turn, concluding that while each has some merit, none offers a fatal case 
against disaggregation as a response to cross-remedial spillover. 
 
A.  Conceptual Concerns 
 
How can the same rule mean different things depending on the 
remedial setting in which courts interpret it?  The Constitution does not 
contain one Fourth Amendment for suppression hearings and another for 
probable cause hearings.  It does not contain one Due Process Clause for 
injunctive relief and another for damages relief.  And hybrid statutes do not 
(by definition) provide for differentiated substantive protections in different 
remedial settings.  Recognizing these realities may seem to pose a 
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formidable obstacle to an anti-spillover strategy grounded in applying rights 
differently depending on the remedy that is sought.  If the texts we interpret 
are unitary, then it would seem that our interpretations of those texts must 
be uniform.151  The “oneness” of such texts, in other words, counsels 
against assigning different substantive rules to different remedial settings. 
The problem with this argument lies in its failure to distinguish 
between two types of problems that judges confront: (1) higher-level 
problems of legal interpretation; and (2) lower-level problems of legal 
implementation.152  Not every doctrinal dispute concerns the “meaning” of a 
legal text; many such disputes operate closer to the ground, focusing on 
how legal provisions, their meaning once gleaned, apply to discrete 
individual requests for judicial relief.  Constitutional lawyers have long 
understood this point.  As Professor Richard Fallon has put the point, 
although it is true that “the Court must craft doctrine in light of judgments 
about what the Constitution means,” it is also true that “determinations of 
constitutional meaning do not always, or perhaps even typically, dictate 
with full precision what constitutional doctrine ought to be.”153  Indeed, 
much doctrine exists not so much to resolve “uncertainty about which 
values the Constitution encompasses and how protected values should be 
specified,” but rather for the less grandiose—but vitally important—purpose 
of “implement[ing]” the values once specified.154  Similar insights animate 
Professor Mitchell Berman’s work on “constitutional decision rules”—the 
large body of presumptions, evidentiary burdens, balancing tests, means-
end analyses, and other doctrinal creations that permeate judge-made 
constitutional law.  “Much of existing constitutional doctrine,” he argues, 
                                                
151 See, e.g., Sachs, supra note ?, at ? (defending “core principle” of uniform meaning 
by reference to fact that Congress would have specified different levels of enforcement for 
hybrid statutes if that’s what it had intended). 
152 Some scholars use the term “construction” rather than “implementation,” see, e.g., 
Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation/Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMM. 95 
(2010). 
153 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing 
the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 67 (1997) (emphasis added).  Professor Fallon’s 
statement is true in at least two different senses.  First, constitutional meaning may fail to 
dictate a particular outcome of a particular case.  Even a full understanding of a provision’s 
semantic content, in other words, may still leave us unable to say with certainty whether a 
given constitutional claim should succeed or fail.  Second, constitutional meaning may 
sometimes dictate outcomes in particular cases that—for pragmatic reasons—courts may 
nonetheless decline to produce.  Hence arises the suggestion of Professor Fallon (and that 
of several other scholars) that courts sometimes over- and/or underenforce constitutional 
norms, generating doctrinal results that do not directly follow from what the constitutional 
text would seem to require.  See, e.g., Henry P. Mongahan, Foreword: Constitutional 
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1985); Sager, supra note ?; David A. Strauss, The 
Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190 (1988). 
154 Id. at 56, 62. 
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“is better understood not as judicial statements of constitutional meaning 
(i.e., as constitutional operative propositions) but rather as judicial 
directions regarding how courts should decide whether such operative 
propositions have been satisfied.”155 
Mapping the doctrinal landscape in this way helps to demonstrate 
why variations in substantive doctrine need not reflect variations in textual 
meaning.  Some constitutional cases—often of the blockbuster variety—
require courts to speak in terms of what Professor Berman calls “operative 
propositions” of constitutional law (e.g., the Fourteenth Amendment 
governs affirmative action; the First Amendment governs campaign finance 
regulation; the Commerce Clause restricts Congress’s ability to regulate 
economic “inactivity,” etc.), and it would be odd indeed to encounter cross-
remedial variations in holdings stated at such high levels of generality.  But 
in many constitutional cases, the content of the operative proposition is not 
at issue; what matters instead is how the proposition translates into real-
world judicial outcomes.  And in these sorts of cases, the unitary nature of 
the text provides no good reason for maintaining absolute substantive 
uniformity across different remedial environments.  By employing a 
conceptual apparatus that “cleav[es] meaning from rules”—as Professor 
Jennifer Laurin has put it—courts can vary the latter without destabilizing 
the former.156 
This is not to say that it will always be easy to distinguish between 
questions of overarching meaning and questions of implementation, or that 
we can cleanly articulate the difference between “operative constitutional 
propositions” and “constitutional decision rules.”  Some would say that 
Washington v. Davis’s holding goes to the core meaning of the Equal 
Protection Clause, while others would be more inclined to view the holding 
as a setting forth a “decision rule” about the evidentiary burdens that equal 
protection claimants bear.  Still others would regard these distinctions as 
pointless, instead maintaining that “the meaning of a constitutional 
provision is its implementation”—nothing less and nothing more.157  
Conceptual disagreements aside,158 however, the critical point remains:  
Remedy-based variations in substantive doctrine need not create tension 
with the unitary nature of the enactments from which they derive. 
So much for constitutional enactments; what about their 
                                                
155 Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 12 (2004). 
156 Laurin, supra note ?, at 1014.   
157 Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Pragmatist’s View of Constitutional Implementation and 
Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 173, 175 (2006). 
158 We can put this conceptual agreement to the side, I believe, because the pragmatist 
position that constitutional meaning is always equivalent to constitutional implementation 
is not likely to accompany the affirmatively non-pragmatist belief that constitutional 
meaning, so defined, must maintain formal uniformity across remedial boundaries. 
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nonconstitutional counterparts?  Here, the conceptual argument against 
cross-remedial variation might pack a bigger punch.  With modern-day 
statutes, as opposed to ancient constitutional provisions, one can more 
easily resort to the claim that if “Congress intends distinctions between 
different forms of enforcement under a hybrid statute, it can simply write 
them into the statutory text.”159  And the proponent of uniformity can often 
wield alluring expressio unius arguments as well.  In some hybrid statutes, 
Congress has specified that particular substantive norms ought to apply 
differently depending on the remedial setting in which they operate.  From 
these statutes, one might infer that Congress considered—and rejected—the 
possibility of permitting cross-remedial variations other than those directly 
manifested by the text itself.160  No surprise then that the Supreme Court 
recently characterized as “novel” and “dangerous” the idea that “judges can 
give the same statutory text different meanings in different cases.”161 
Even with respect to statutes, however, it is far from clear that the 
conceptual claim for uniformity supports a categorical prohibition on 
substantive variation across remedies.  To begin with, as Professor Jonathan 
Siegel has shown, the Court’s recent admonitions about the “novelty” and 
“dangerousness” of varying the scope of statutory commands from one 
context to another are belied by many of its earlier pronouncements, which 
have attached “multiple meanings” to “a single term or phrase in a single 
statutory provision” depending on the factual or remedial setting in which it 
is applied.162  In addition, notwithstanding the tendency of courts and 
commentators to associate statutory cases with “interpretative” problems, 
the “decision rules” insight seems no less applicable to statutory rules than 
to constitutional rules.  With statutes, as with the Constitution, we need not 
discern any and all variations in the substantive doctrine as registering 
multiple “interpretations” or “meanings” of a single textual provision; 
rather, we may instead characterize them as registering multiple 
implementation strategies for a provision whose semantic content—or 
“operative proposition”—remains fixed.163  And finally, arguments of the 
“if they’d meant it, they’d have said it” variety have a question-begging 
quality to them.  Congress can just as easily prohibit non-uniform 
enforcement of hybrid statutes as it can permit such enforcement, so why 
                                                
159 Sachs, supra note ?, at 1031. 
160 Id. 
161 Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386 (2005). 
162 See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Polymorphic Principle and the Judicial Role in 
Statutory Interpretation, 84 TEX. L. REV. 339, 341 (2005); see also Aaron Greene 
Liederman, Agency Polymorphism, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 781 (2009). 
163 Cf. Tun-Jen Chiang & Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction 
Distinction in Patent Law, 121 YALE L.J. (forthcoming), manuscript at 31–41 (applying 
framework to courts’ enforcement of patent claims). 
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should we infer anything at all from the absence of express guidance one 
way or the other?  Rather than speculate as to what Congress did or did not 
mean to communicate via its failure to articulate how a single statutory 
provision should apply across remedial boundaries, courts might simply try 
their best to forge practical doctrinal responses to questions that were in 
reality unaddressed in the drafting process. 
 
B.  Administrability Concerns 
 
A more significant objection to the disaggregation strategy sounds in 
worries about complexity and administrability.  On a simplified model of 
the status quo regime, courts enforce a finite number of rights by way of a 
finite number of remedies.  To evaluate a given claim for relief, they refer 
first to a discrete body of substantive law, whose content does not formally 
depend on the remedy being sought, and then to a discrete body of remedial 
law, whose content does not formally depend on the right being invoked.  
Adjudicating matters in this way produces substantial informational 
shortcuts for judges and litigants alike.  If the law contains N different rights 
and M different remedies, courts can handle N x M right-remedy 
combinations by reference to N + M bodies of law.  That is, courts and 
litigants can sequentially employ a small number of substantive and 
remedial doctrines (e.g., First Amendment law, Second Amendment law, 
the law of injunctions, the law of damages) to resolve a much larger number 
of potential right-remedy requests (e.g., a demand for injunctions as redress 
for a Second Amendment violation, a demand for damages as a redress for a 
First Amendment violation, a demand for exclusion as a redress for a Fourth 
Amendment violation, and so on). If we have ten different substantive rules, 
enforceable via five different remedial rules, then fifteen bodies of doctrine 
provide all the guidance we need.  In contrast, a fully disaggregated regime 
could produce as many as fifty different “right-remedy” bodies of law to 
govern the same set of cases. 
At its endmost extreme, my call for disaggregated substantive law 
would substantially increase the number of different doctrines that judges 
must create and lawyers must learn.  No longer could a request for damages 
under the First Amendment be resolved by reference to a single cross-
remedial rule of First Amendment doctrine and a single transsubstantive 
rule of § 1983 doctrine.  Courts would instead consult a specialized, self-
contained area of “First Amendment damages” doctrine, which would exist 
alongside thousands of other self-contained bodies of “right-remedy” law.  
It takes no great leap of imagination to envision the confusion, complexity, 
and frustration that such an arrangement might yield.  Is that a price worth 
paying for the sole sake of mitigating spillover? 
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Probably not.  But we need not frame the issue as presenting an all-
or-nothing choice.  Instead of asking whether we should permit total 
disaggregation of the substantive law or no disaggregation at all, we should 
simply ask whether judges might sometimes adapt substantive rules to 
particular remedial contexts as a means of attacking spillover.  The relevant 
inquiry, in other words, involves the extent to which judges should vary 
substantive requirements according to remedial demands, rather than the 
propriety or non-propriety of their doing so on an unrestrained, wholesale 
basis.  Indeed, one of the great virtues of the disaggregation strategy is its 
ability to accommodate a substantial amount of fine-tuning.  One can, for 
example, disaggregate First Amendment prior restraint law from First 
Amendment subsequent punishment law, while still ensuring that most key 
substantive principles of free speech doctrine remain constant across each.  
And one can tolerate some amount variance between higher and lower 
courts in the application of “structural” trial rights, while still adhering to a 
core set of requirements that both lower courts and higher courts must 
enforce.  Much more so than the “non-disaggregation” strategies discussed 
in Part II, the disaggregation strategy permits judges to tailor the degree and 
character of their disaggregating solutions according to the degree and 
character of the spillover problems they confront.  Rather than “missiles to 
kill mice,” the disaggregation strategy gives them mousetraps. 
The question then becomes how much disaggregation we should 
tolerate.  At its core, this question presents yet another variant on the rules-
standards tradeoff.164  Cross-remedial uniformity in the substantive law 
promotes simplicity, predictability, low decision costs, and so forth; cross-
remedial variation promotes adaptability, nuance, and fewer distortions in 
the law.  How far we want to take the disaggregation strategy depends 
largely on where we fall on the rules/standards spectrum.  The more we like 
rules, the less we will want to disaggregate; the more we like standards, the 
more we will look to do so. 
My goal here is not to prescribe the optimal degree of 
disaggregation that the spillover problem demands.  Such a prescription—in 
addition to implicating the deep divides of the rules/standards dilemma—
would likely depend on a host of contextual factors that will vary according 
to the particular rights being disaggregated and the particular remedies 
across which the disaggregation occurs. I do believe, however, that fears 
related to complexity and administrability should not automatically force us 
to dismiss out of hand the disaggregation strategy as a means of addressing 
the spillover problem.  This is not to say that concerns about elaborateness 
and unworkability do not matter.  No doubt, they reflect an important 
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Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985). 
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consideration that any response to the spillover problem must take into 
account.  But these fears are not reasons in themselves to eschew 
disaggregation altogether. 
 
C.  Rule-of-Law Concerns 
 
A related objection to this project might charge that disaggregation 
as a response to cross-remedial spillover puts judges on a slippery slope 
toward the eventual abandonment of important rule-of-law values.  Law, it 
is said, succeeds as a fair and just means of governance when its commands 
are generally applicable,165 thus satisfying what Lon Fuller called the “first 
desideratum of a system for subjecting human conduct to the governance of 
rules.”166  In addition to keeping doctrine administrable and 
comprehensible, the law’s generality helps to ensure that “like parties get 
treated alike” and that cases get resolved (and evaluated) by reference to 
objective and non-manipulable criteria, rather than the idiosyncrasies of 
individual judges.  Disaggregating the law, by definition, makes the law’s 
articulation more nuanced, less general, and more context-dependent.  As a 
result, disaggregation might seem unfaithful to the project of having a legal 
system in the first place. 
No one, I suspect, would argue that all forms of cross-remedial 
disaggregation pose an existential challenge to our legal order.  Employing 
one set of substantive rules for criminal cases and another for civil cases, 
for example, would reduce the generality of substantive doctrine, but not in 
a way that would provoke anxieties about the rule of law’s collapse.  
(Criminal and civil cases, after all, have for hundreds of years employed 
different standards of proof and different mens rea rules without the sky 
falling down.)  But “remedies” and “remedial environments” can be defined 
at higher and lower levels of detail, and the higher the levels of detail 
become, the less law-like cross-remedial distinctions may begin seem.  
Simple distinctions across, say, “criminal” and “civil” remedies, or 
“monetary” and “injunctive” remedies, would inject differentiation into the 
substantive law without undermining its law-like character.  But as the 
distinctions are defined with greater specificity, the threat to rule-of-law 
values intensifies.  Judges, we might all agree, can safeguard generality 
while varying the substantive law across cases involving damage awards 
and cases involving injunctive relief.  But what about varying it across cases 
involving “high” damage awards and cases involving “low” damage 
                                                
165 See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 46–48 (1964); Kent Greenawalt, 
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awards?  Across cases involving “high damage awards sought against poor 
defendants” and cases involving “high damage awards sought against rich 
defendants”?  Across cases involving “high damage awards sought against 
poor defendants with insurance” and cases involving “high damage awards 
sought against poor defendants without insurance”?  We could continue this 
exercise ad nauseam until the operative “remedial environment” of a given 
case boiled down to little more than its unique set of facts.  At that point, 
judges would no longer be applying “law” in any meaningful sense.  Rather, 
they would be resolving individual cases in accordance with whatever they 
perceived justice to demand. 
The takeaway from this point is not that we give up on the project of 
alleviating cross-remedial spillover.  Rather, it is that courts must recognize 
some cut-off point to the level of detail at which they distinguish remedial 
domains from one another.  I cannot say precisely where on the spectrum 
that cut-off point lies, but it does seem to me that we are very far from it.  
The substantive doctrine of today—which, as we have seen, tends to apply 
uniformly across even broadly-defined remedial categories—seems capable 
of absorbing significantly more differentiation across remedies while still 
maintaining its law-like character.  Courts may therefore continue to 
employ disaggregation strategies in response to the spillover problem 
without giving rule-of-law proponents much cause for concern.  
That being said, the rule-of-law objection does provide reason to 
temper our expectations about what disaggregation can achieve.  Spillover 
in one form or another will inevitably occur as a consequence of developing 
generally applicable rules via case-specific adjudication.  We can isolate 
holdings and differentiate across remedial variables so as to limit potential 
cross-remedial spillover effects.  But even when we have done this, the 
factual particularities of one case might still yield substantive rules that 
“spill over” into other factual contexts that would not have otherwise 
produced them.  If an especially winsome defendant raises a borderline 
Fourth Amendment claim, his especially winsome nature might compel a 
court to vindicate his claim and thereby create a precedent that dictates the 
outcome of cases against less winsome defendants.  An unusually 
complicated request for injunctive relief might prompt judges to deny 
recognition of a substantive claim and thereby create precedent governing 
cases involving simpler injunctive requests.167  We can keep on trying to 
cabin the results of these cases to the particular factual settings that 
produced them, but at some point we will have to resist these urges lest we 
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throw in the towel on maintaining generally applicable rules of law.168  
This Article, however, has neither promised nor advocated 
spillover’s total eradication.  Rather, it has sought to identify a particular 
form of spillover—spillover across remedies—whose reduction seems 
feasible and worth pursuing.  Generality is a good thing.  But even in good 
things we can partake too much.  Just because the virtues of generality 
preclude us from achieving total success in the battle against spillover does 
not mean that we should give up on achieving any such success at all. To 
the contrary, as I hope this Article has shown, substantial—though not 
total—success in the battle against spillover lies within our reach. 
 
D.  The Special Problem of Vertical Spillover 
 
Some forms of spillover occur across remedial settings at different 
levels of the judicial hierarchy.  I have suggested, for instance, that trial 
judges who conduct suppression hearings may be less inclined to invalidate 
a search ex post than magistrate judges would be to prohibit the same search 
ex ante.  Similarly, I have suggested that appellate judges may be more 
reluctant to sustain post-trial allegations of structural error than trial judges 
confronting such errors as they arise.  These forms of “vertical spillover” 
can be met with disaggregating responses.  Courts might invoke exceptions 
to “higher-level” judicial remedies, such as by denying exclusionary relief 
to the victims of unlawful searches that are conducted in good faith while 
making clear that magistrate judges should have never issued a warrant for 
such searches in the first place.  Or they can disaggregate the law more 
subtly, such as by defining rights in open-ended terms and then 
emphasizing deference to the substantive determinations of their lower-
court counterparts.  Either way, courts can confront the risk of vertical 
spillover by fashioning substantive holdings with limited precedential 
effects on lower-court adjudication. 
  But disaggregation in response to vertical spillover presents a 
special problem.  Higher-level courts are supposed to supervise the work of 
their lower-level counterparts, and vertical disaggregation will undermine 
their ability to exercise oversight.  The more often that higher courts 
combine loosely defined substantive standards with principles of deference 
on review, the freer the rein that lower courts receive to craft and apply the 
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law as they see fit. And, while this free rein has the virtue of reducing 
spillover across remedies, it also has the vice of inhibiting higher courts’ 
abilities to monitor for erroneous applications of the law below.  (The Gates 
standard, for instance, may help to prevent rights-constricting forces of the 
suppression hearing context from affecting the law that warrant-issuing 
magistrates apply, but it also means that magistrates need not worry too 
much about a reversal of their judgments in subsequent criminal 
proceedings.)  Vertical disaggregation thus implicates a deep and inexorable 
tension between two conflicting interests: (a) the interest in preventing 
remedy-based influences unique to higher-court review from constricting 
the substantive rules that lower courts apply, and (b) the interest in ensuring 
that lower courts’ application of the law is subject to meaningful 
supervision. 
How to balance these two conflicting interests is a difficult question.  
Its answer sometimes depends on empirical uncertainties.  For example, to 
what extent do trial and appellate judges actually suffer from hindsight bias 
when resolving Fourth Amendment claims? Recent empirical research 
suggests that judges may be more resistant to the bias than has generally 
been supposed,169 in which case the Gates standard may require too much 
deference to magistrate-level probable cause determinations.  And, even if 
we could resolve all the empirical unknowns, the tradeoff may involve areas 
of deep normative disagreement:  For instance, reducing appellate courts’ 
control over trial court-level review of structural errors disaggregates the 
law not just across the appellate-court/trial-court divide, but also among the 
many different trial courts within an appellate court’s jurisdiction.  Similar 
litigants may receive varied judicial treatment, as different trial judges—
lacking specific dictates from above—will end up applying different 
versions of the same substantive protections.  The degree to which this 
outcome strikes us as problematic—and hence, vertical disaggregation as 
undesirable—will depend on nothing less fundamental than our sense of 
what it means to receive fair and equal treatment under the law. 
Consequently, the case for disaggregation is more tentative as 
applied to vertical spillover than as applied to horizontal spillover.  Happily, 
though, the sensibility of the vertical disaggregation strategy is a question 
that may itself be disaggregated.  We need not decide, once and for all, 
whether the costs of vertical disaggregation exceed its benefits. Rather, we 
may evaluate the strategy on a case-by-case basis, with due attention to the 
particular substantive norm at issue, as well as the particular remedial 
environments across which the disaggregation might occur.  My hope is that 
the foregoing discussion, while not rendering a definitive verdict on the 
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vertical disaggregation strategy itself, at least identifies the criteria we 
should consult when determining whether to disaggregate across vertically 
situated remedies. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The analysis I have offered may strike some readers as a beginning 
from a theoretically dubious premise.  On a pragmatic conception of the 
law, there simply is no meaningful difference between rights and 
remedies—a right, in other words, counts for no more (and no less) than the 
bundle of remedies it allows one to invoke, and a remedy counts for no 
more (and no less) than the bundle of rights that it allows one to enforce.170  
At the end of the day, there are just litigants and judicial actors, and the law 
is nothing more than a means by which the former get the latter to do things 
on their behalf.  What ultimately matters is the question of how the law—
whether articulated in terms of “rights,” “remedies,” or both—permits 
courts to flex their muscle against the outside world.  Understood in this 
light, the entire project of trying to respond to cross-remedial spillover 
within the substantive law might seem doomed from the start.  For the 
project engages with a set of categories that are conceptually empty to begin 
with.   
I take seriously the pragmatists’ notion that the right/remedy 
distinction may not be able to withstand serious theoretical scrutiny.  For 
purposes of this project, however, the conceptual soundness of the right-
remedy distinction is beside the point.  Whatever its conceptual soundness, 
the right-remedy distinction is one around which our doctrinal universe has 
been organized, and that organizational choice carries important real-world 
consequences for the actual content of the law.  The pragmatist may be 
correct, in other words, to suggest that a well-functioning body of law need 
not base itself around formally independent categories such as “rights” and 
“remedies,” and there may well exist more sensible ways of arranging and 
expressing the rules that govern the resolution of individual cases.  But 
when the law organizes itself around these categories, we must think 
carefully about the ways in which the arrangement frustrates and facilitates 
the achievement of desirable judicial outcomes.  Attending to the problem 
of spillover across remedies provides a means of doing just that. 
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